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ABSTRACT
The bunkering industry provides the shipping industry with the fuel oil that the
vessels consume. The quality of the fuel oil provided will ensure the safe operation of
vessels. Shipping companies under their fuel oil management programme confirm that
the quality and quantity of fuel oil provided are as requested. To be certain of the quality
and quantity loaded, correctly performed bunkering procedures need to be integrated in
the fuel oil management programme. The data collected through them will prove more
than useful when a dispute arises either in terms of fuel oil quality or the loaded quantity.
Ship emissions to air are a concern of IMO and recently the European Union, as
the shipping industry contrary to land-based industries is not yet subject to any
regulations to reduce emissions. Sulphur oxides are targeted as they depend on the
sulphur content of the fuel oil. Identical limits are set by both the IMO and the EU, but
IMO's regulations are yet to be ratified and EU will not accept any vessels travelling
within its waters to bum high-sulphur fuel oil from 2010 onwards. Till then, those
involved in the matter might have to consider implementing an emissions trading scheme,
as in the land-based industries, as a more viable option to capping sulphur content.
Every shipowner is aware of the fact that the single most costly and highly
volatile running cost paid is the cost of bunkers. The options available to him/her are
hedging instruments such as futures and OTC products. When used effectively along
with freight futures, although not yet commonly available, shipping companies may
reduce their risk exposure and enhance their profits.
When purchasing fuel oil from a number of ports, cost savings may be augmented
by a carefully improvised bunkering planning, as well as negotiating the price of fuel oil
purchased based on its density, aluminium content, viscosity, water content and net
specific energy.
Thesis Supervisor: Henry S. Marcus
Title: Professor of Marine Systems
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fuel oil is of great importance to the shipping industry. The prime movers of the
merchant vessels will consume fossil fuel, until the day it will cease to exist. Bunkers
make up the largest part of a ship's running costs, and always have done. It is estimated
that their cost comprises a percentage of 50-60% of the total running costs, i.e. dialy
running costs and voyage costs.
Marine fuel oil consists largely of a residue that remains from crude oil
distillation after stripping off all components of lower boiling ranges. It consists of a
great variety of long chain hydrocarbons in a boiling range predominantly well above that
of gas oil. As crude oil varies widely in composition and quality, so does the residue. In
particular, there are crude oils of high and low viscosity, high and low sulphur content,
etc. This results in varying yields of residues suitable for producing marine fuel oil.
Furthermore, a refiner for economic reasons is interested to extract as many high value
fractions from the crude oil. "A modem refinery of sophisticated design is operated to
affect precisely this. Little or even no residue at all is left today. The consequence is that
these residues contain most components and contaminants of the crude oil undesired in
the high value products in a high concentration. Inevitably, therefore, the last 30 years of
'upgrading' refineries have resulted in a corresponding downgrading of residues and in
consequence marine fuel oil quality." [Ref. 6, 19971
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2 QUALITY AND QUANTITY MANAGEMENT
2.1 QUALITY OF MARINE FUEL OILS
The quality of a fuel has an effect on:
" The combustion process
o The exhaust valves
o The inlet valves and pumps
o The turbochargers and exhaust gas system
" The handling of the fuel
o The fuel treatment process
2.1.1 QUALITY PARAMETERS
" Density (kg/m3)
* Viscosity (cSt)
* Pour Point and Cloud Point ("C)
" Flash Point ("C)
" Carbon Residue (% m/m)
* Asphaltenes (mg/kg)
* Ash Content (% m/m) - Al/Si (mg/kg) - Vanadium (mg/kg)
* Water and Sea Water (% v/v)
* Sulphur (% m/m)
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* Compatibility and Stability
* Ignition Quality
Information on each of the above quality parameters is not mentioned in the
thesis, since it is not the purpose of this project to establish basic knowledge on fuels. It
is important to know though in what way will each of these affect the onboard usage of
the fuel. This is diagrammatically illustrated in the following figure.
Density
VViscosity
Flash Point
Has an effect on Water
Handling Carbon ResidueProperties Sulphur
Ash Content - AI/Si - Vanadium+ Has an effect on
Compatibility and Stability -- the Engine
Asphaltenes Operation
Ignition Quality D
Pour Point
Specific Energy
Figure 2.1: The fuel oil quality parameters and their effect on the Handling Properties
and Engine Operation. [Ref. 17, 1993]
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2.1.2 FUEL QUALITY TRENDS
Examination of quality records shows rapid increases in the global average
density and carbon residue in the late 1970s and early 1980s, indicative of the increasing
absorption of residue conversion process and other secondary refining technology.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the rapid change in average density about that period, and the
subsequent much slower increase. Figure 2.3 presents more recent data on average
carbon residue trends, which confirms that the rate of change of fuel quality has slowed
considerably. What we are seeing today is not the rapid change which caused the
justified concern in the 1970s, but a more gradual shift. A slowly increasing proportion
of today's fuels are approaching the critical specification maxima, but there is no pressure
from the supply perspective for these maxima to be relaxed to provide continued
availability of fuel.
0.99 -
0.985
0.98
0.975
0.97
1981 1962 1963 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Figure 2.2: Average density of all fuels worldwide in the 250-400 cSt viscosity band, for
the period 1981 to 1991. [Ref 13, 1998]
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Figure 2.3: Average carbon residue values for IFO bunkers supplied during the period
1988-1997. [Ref. 13, 1998]
There are probably two reasons for the slowdown. In recent years, there has been
little need or little opportunity for investment in new residue conversion processes in
refineries. Where there has been major investment, it has sometimes been in a new
generation of residue conversion processes which produce little or no fuel oil. It is
anticipated that the same trends will continue in the future. Where refiners do need to
invest in residue conversion processes, the chosen processes are likely to be those which
minimise fuel oil production, since projections show a declining market for fuel oil in the
future. "There will be a continuing decline in the amount of straight-run residue which
goes into the bunker fuel oil pool, both because some of the older straight-run refineries
will close, and because straight-run residue will have a higher value as a feedstock for
secondary refining rather than as a fuel oil component. The overall effect will be a
12
continuation of the current slow drift of average fuel quality towards the specification
maximum, and is likely to be accompanied by a continued tightening of fuel oil
availability." [Ref. 13, 1998]
2.1.3 TEMPTATIONS TO REDUCE QUALITY
Global oil demand growth is projected to have slowed to an average of
1.3% per year for the period 1997 to 2000, reflecting the loss of incremental
Asian oil demand and three consecutive milder-than-usual winters in the Northern
Hemisphere. Post 2000, with the resumption of Asian oil demand growth, world
oil demand growth is expected to rise again to annual average levels of around
2%. The world residual bunker fuel demand (excluding marine gas oil) has
increased from 105 million metric tonnes in 1990 to almost 120 million in 1998.
The global bunker fuel demand is expected to increase only slightly between 1999
and 2005 with an annual growth rate of 0.3%. In Europe, the Pacific, the Middle
East and the Far East, the supply/demand balance for bunkers will move towards
an oversupply. Furthermore, in many parts of the world the marine market may
become the main market for residual fuel oil. In particular, the power generation
"dash for gas" will progressively release low quality components into the bunker
market, fuel oil previously designated for power generation. In the longer term
this may also be an effect of reduced need for residual fuels to be imported to the
US. [Ref. 8, October 2000]
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Figure 2.4: World Residual Bunker Fuel Demand 1990-2010. [Ref. 8, October 2000]
The over supply of residual fuel in terms of heavier components tend to
drive prices, and therefore margins for suppliers, down. In addition to price,
competition amongst sellers on the quality of product is unlikely to disappear.
Indeed in such an environment, a few temptations may arise for those suppliers
who do not need to protect their brand, or those who find it difficult to sell high
quality product at a reasonable price. Despite the existence of internationally
recognised supply specifications, fierce competition between suppliers may mean
that the gap between high and low quality product supplies may well widen in the
future. [Ref. 8, October 2000]
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2.1.4 OFF SPEC FUELS
A fuel can be off spec in any of the quality parameters. It is true that today's
engines will run with several grades of residual fuel oil. By off spec fuels, one does not
mean the case of a fuel being of a different grade than the one proposed by the engine
manufacturer to be used. Not meeting the required specification of the grade ordered will
characterise a fuel as being off spec.
"There are opinions stating that 70% of all marine engine problems are fuel
related." [Ref 19, 1995] "Fact is that at reputable suppliers more than 99% of all
deliveries investigated are on spec, a few are minor overshoots, and one in 1000 only is
definitely unfit for use." [Ref 6, 1997]
Engine builders have been trying to develop reliable engines, and in the case of
SULZER RTA-engines, fuel oil of 810 cSt viscosity is the 'Bunker limit' which indicates
minimum quality of heavy fuel oil to feed. When we look into the statistics of DNV fuel
oil analysis, however, there are so many varieties of the most commonly used 380 cSt
fuel and corresponding fuel oils available in the market.
"Bunker quality makes the news only when people think they have had a bad lot
of fuel. But bunker quality is not just about how fuel meets specifications. Almost all of
the very few disputes which arise over bunkers stem not from the fuel itself, but from
misunderstandings which have occurred somewhere in the whole chain of bunker
purchasing and supply. It is extremely rare to get a load of fuel which cannot be burnt. It
is less rare to find people involved in the purchase and supply of bunkers who
unintentionally turn minor technical problems into major disputes through a lack of
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understanding." [Ref. 20, June 2000] "Whatever the case, one strike (bunkering) is
enough to destroy a marine engine in service." [Ref. 10, October 2000]
2.1.5 FUEL OIL CONTAMINANTS
Except from the case of a fuel being out of spec, a fuel oil might contain chemical
waste. This might be in the form of used lubricants, polypropylene, organic acids,
cleaning chemicals and hydrogen sulphide.
"IMO strives to ban chemical waste from inclusion into marine fuel oil.
Reputable suppliers will support this concept. However, agreement on a clear and
unambiguous definition of what constitutes 'chemical waste' is needed, and its presence
and concentration should be monitored and recorded. IMO, and in consequence ISO,
have to develop a policy on above, considering fully environmental, technical and
economic aspects." [Ref. 6, 1997]
In particular, concerning the waste lube oil addition, some say that if properly
managed, it is an environmentally effective way of disposing of a difficult waste product
of the domestic motoring habit. Others say that, no matter how small the operational risk,
the addition of waste lube was in contravention of the international fuel quality standard
ISO 8217, specifically clause 4.1 which states:
"The fuels shall be blends of hydrocarbons derived from petroleum refining. This shall
not preclude the incorporation of small amounts of additives intended to improve some
aspect of performance. The fuels shall be free of inorganic acid.
NOTE 3 The fuel should not include any substance which
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. jeopardises the safety of ships or adversely affects the performance of the machinery
2. is harmful to personnel; or
3. contributes overall to additional air pollution." [Ref. 35, 1996]
One oil major picked up the baton and undertook research (together with a
leading manufacturer of fuel treatment plant) to identify the risks to ship systems and to
quantify the same. The result of that research was published in 2000. "The summary
concluded that the industry norm of up to five per cent waste lube oil could lead to a
considerable reduction in fuel treatment efficiency. Even small percentages showed
some deterioration and that the researchers felt that the amount of any added waste lube
oil should be strictly controlled in the next revision of ISO 8217." [Ref. 4, March 2002]
The new ISO standard will cover waste automotive lube oil but every few months
another contaminant in fuel oil is identified with the potential to do damage to machinery
or crew, as mentioned before polypropylene, organic acids, cleaning chemicals and
hydrogen sulphide. Adding parameters to the specification to control every eventuality
should be controlled as the time and cost of testing will become uneconomic, but that
does not mean that sellers should not seriously consider the oil's fitness for purpose. "At
the moment all of them exclude this specifically in their sales terms and claim it is the
buyer's responsibility to select exactly what his ship needs. I think this is somewhat
disingenuous as we all know that 90 per cent of marine heavy fuel is going to be used in a
slow speed diesel engine and that the seller should declare that this is the basis of the
product, leaving the buyers, to advise if they need a superior product for their particular
engine or if they can accept a lower standard, say for a steamship. Some may say that the
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supplier's attitude of caveat emptor is as inappropriate to modem business as the
shipyard's guarantee of one year on the ship." [Ref. 4, March 2002]
2.2 QUALITY AND QUANTITY MANAGEMENT
A supplier has to deliver an agreed quantity of a specified quality at the contracted
time and place. Murphy's Law says: "When things can go wrong, they will do". [Ref. 16,
1985] "In consequence contracts, documents, procedures, notes, etc. must contain
instructions that do not allow "things to go wrong" i.e. other than agreed. It is,
furthermore, fact of life that specifications without adequate controls will not be followed
consequently." [Ref. 6, 1997]
2.2.1 QUANTITY
"Marine fuels are sold on a mass basis with few exemptions: Gas oil in small
quantities is supplied in litres to inland waterway and fishery vessels as well as leisure
craft. In view of the problem to weigh large quantities of fuel the way adopted nearly
always is to measure the volume and convert to mass by multiplying with the density".
[Ref 6, 19971
With the recent increases in bunker prices the question of the quantity of received
bunkers has reappeared creating the problems of alleged short deliveries of this costly
material. Some methods and techniques, which are used by the bunker suppliers to avoid
full delivery, or at least make the vessel believe that it has reached its full contracted
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amount, appear to range from at best most devious to the outright scandalous. "Last year
DNVPS have issued their Bunker Alerts warning their customers of the devious use of
compressed air or nitrogen that was used by certain bunker barges in Singapore for the
apparent clearing of pipelines upon completion of delivery of bunkers to a vessel.
Although on face value such a technique may be valid from a pollution prevention
perspective to avoid the potential of any residue leaks from the bunker hose when
disconnecting from the receiving vessel, clearly, such barges carrying out this technique
do not have drip trays of adequate capacity or have systems in place to drain the delivery
hose back to the bunker barge upon completion of bunkering. This being the apparent or
potential reason, one must ask the question as to whether the barge is seaworthy for the
function or service it is performing within the confined waters off Singapore and the
potential pollution problems to be associated with a bunker spill. Notwithstanding the
foregoing, the consequences for the measurement of the delivered bunker quantity
onboard the receiving vessel could be large. By entraining air or nitrogen within a
viscous bunker the resulting observed volume will be artificially increased over a short
period of time until the entrapped gases evolve from the liquid bunker. Furthermore the
use of nitrogen can cause an artificial drop in the viscosity of the bunker over a short
period thereby impacting the apparent quality of the material received." [Ref. 34,
February 2001]
Having said that, without the purpose being that of giving a bad name to the port
of Singapore, the author would like to mention that from January 2002 the Maritime and
Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) have amended their Bunkering CP 60 procedures
with regard to the location of bunker sampling. The new bunkering procedure requires
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that bunker samples for the delivery of bunkers to ships will take place at the 'point of
custody', which is at the vessel's main bunker receiving manifold. Although the above
bunker sampling procedure is accredited by all three fuel analytical services (DNVPS,
FOBAS and ABS), it is not common practice for many ports and operators. As it is seen,
Singapore being a major port has only recently implemented it. Furthermore, sampling at
the point of custody helps to resolve bunker disputes, concerning quality. [see Chapter 3]
2.2.2 QUALITY
"It is frequently claimed that the quality of marine fuels in general is deteriorating
since years. This statement is endorsed by referring to a few spectacular engine damages
in which inferior fuel quality was found to be the culprit. This is a regrettable
imprecision of language: Either the fuel was out of spec. Hence it was inferior. Or it was
on spec. In case this spec (like ISO 8217) was mutually agreed, the fuel was as
contracted and not inferior." [Ref. 6, 1997]
"If there is no doubt or dispute about which sample represents the bunkers
supplied, and if the quality of that sample is then assessed by a mutually agreed
laboratory, a rapid assessment in the majority of cases can be made. Either the fuel is
within specification, or it is not. However, the absence of an agreed sample of the fuel
will make speedy dispute resolution after the event much more difficult. Even when an
agreed analysis shows that the fuel is outside specification, it can still often be used.
Guidance on using out of spec fuels can be obtained from the major fuel testing
organisations, such as DNV and FOBAS." [Ref. 20, June 2000]
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3 BUNKERING
3.1 BUNKER LOADING PROCEDURES
"The term bunker loading signifies the whole procedure that starts with the
contact with the suppliers for a price quotation and ends after the delivery of the fuel oil."
[Ref. 17, 1993] "Although a marine standard for fuel oil transfer procedures has not
received universal acceptance, several attempts have been prepared which have gained
local acceptance, including the Singapore bunker procedure (SBP) and the American
Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) bunkering protocol of 1993. There is however
an ISO technical report (ISO 13739) entitled 'Methods for Specifying Practical
Procedures for the Transfer of Bunker Fuel to Ships 1998'." [Ref. 1, 2000]
Prior to bunkering, the crew involved in the procedure should be aware of how to
handle safely marine fuel oils. The bunker loading procedure consists of the following
steps:
* Pre-arrival checks and procedures
* Agreement between ship and barge/shore
* Loading procedure
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3.1.1 QUANTITY DETERMINATION
There are several methods by which the chief engineer can calculate the volume of oil
transferred during the bunker transfer operation depending on the equipment available.
These include:
" Measurement of bunker barge tanks and calculation of oil volumes transferred
(dependent on safety implications and ease of access to the bunker barge)
" Measurement of shore based tanks and calculation of the oil volumes transferred
* Measurement of the receiving ship's tanks and calculation of the oil volumes
transferred
" Fuel oil flow meter readings and calculations
[Ref. 1, 2000]
Although these methods may appear to be a mathematically accurate way to
determine the quantities of fuel oil transferred, the accuracy is dependent on several key
factors including:
* Accurate determination of angles of list and trim soundings, ullages, temperatures
and volumes
* The ability of the chief engineer to make the necessary calculations and
corrections
* The accuracy and availability of list and trim correction tables
* The accuracy and availability of volume correction tables
0 The accuracy and availability of temperature correction tables.
[Ref. 1, 2000]
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3.1.2 BUNKER DELIVERY RECEIPT (BDR)
Prior to commencing taking bunkers, a written statement on the BDR must be
received from the suppliers indicating at least viscosity, density, water content, flash
point and fuel delivery temperature for volumetric quantity calculations. If this statement
is not forthcoming by the supplier, the chief engineer should advise the company and
charterers' agent immediately and issue a 'Letter of Protest'. Any statement at this stage
is not proof of bunker quality delivered on board at the manifold but the supplier's
indication of fuel parameters supplied from the refinery/storage tanks.
Before signing the BDR, it should be stamped with the vessel's 'NO LIEN'
stamps. A copy of the bunker receipt should be retained on board and a copy sent to the
head office. The BDR should be signed with the following statement 'Signed for volume
at observed temperature only. Determination of quality will be made upon receipt of fuel
analysis results'. A copy of the BDR should also be enclosed, with the fuel sample sent
to DNV Petroleum Services. For chartered vessels, the chief engineer should sign the
bunker delivery receipt 'Received on behalf of Charterers Messrs...'.
3.1.3 LETTERS OF PROTEST
Prior to the bunkering procedure, the master of a vessel issues a request to the
charterers' port agents and bunker supplier to attend the representative bunkers sampling.
In the event of failing to attend the sampling, the master should issue a letter of protest
[see Appendices 1 and 2]. It is important that, in the event of a bunker quantity dispute
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arising, the master of the receiving ship issues a notice of protest (NOP) as quickly as
possible. The letter of protest should be signed by the master and/or the chief engineer; it
should be directed to the barge master or shore representative and copied to the following
interested parties:
* Shipowner/manager
* Charterer (if time charter bunkers)
" Fuel analysis organisation/laboratory
" Fuel supplier
* Bunker broker
The letter of protest, an example of which is given in Appendix 3, should also be
signed, if possible by the barge master/shore representative and properly stamped with
the ship and barge official stamps.
Quality has not been mentioned yet, since the only information given on quality
is, as aforementioned, by the bunker supplier. Once the fuel is on board, the onboard fuel
testing equipment (if any) will detect any deficiencies until the sample sent to the fuel
analytical service is tested.
3.2 BUNKER SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS
"The process of bunker sampling and fuel analysis is one of the most important
aspects of the fuel or bunker loading operation. Certainly, it provides the most important
piece of single evidence in any bunker quality dispute. Indeed, it is probably true to say
that most bunker quality disputes, will at some stage rely upon the analysis of a
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'representative' sample taken at the time of loading fuel oil bunkers." [Ref. 1, 2000] This
is essentially, at the moment, the goal for the fuel analytical services.
3.2.1 CUSTODY TRANSFER SAMPLING
A mutually-accepted sampling location is the key to obtaining a single and
representative sample of the delivered bunkers. Such a sample can help resolve fuel
quality disputes speedily and efficiently.
There are many possible reasons why a sample may not be representative,
some of which are outlined below:
" A sample taken in 30 seconds from a bunkering that can take up to twenty-four
hours is unlikely to epitomise the quality of the total fuel supplied
* A single sample taken at either the start, middle or end of bunkering will most
probably bear scant resemblance to the actual nature of the fuel supplied as a
whole
* Although ISO 8217 defines the required properties of the fuel at the place of the
custody transfer, the location of this custody transfer is often debated, i.e. the
barge's or the receiving vessel's manifold. That this is an important issue is
reflected by the action of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA),
which in July 2001 amended its bunkering code of practice with effects from
January 2002 to switch to the custody transfer point from the former to the latter
* Barge blending, i.e. circulation within the barge's tanks, may be used to achieve
the grade required; although effective if done correctly, fuel of differing 'quality'
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can be loaded over distinctly separate periods of the bunker transfer, as a uniform
mixture can take time to be established. The taking of a continuous drip sampler,
however, can often contain the correct proportions of the fuel blend components
and therefore show nothing amiss
[Ref. 26, February 2002]
DNV Petroleum Services' (DNVPS) official position on this issue is that there
should be only one location for taking an umpire sample. This is at the point of custody
transfer. The sample taken should be a representative sample taken by continuous drip
method throughout the whole period of the bunkering and this should be the only sample
used as the umpire sample in case of a dispute.
"A bunker fuel contract is no different from a typical commercial transaction in
international trade and should be based on the interpretation of the commercial terms as
defined in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) INCO terms 1990. Many
bunker contracts are based on FOB terms. In accordance with INCO terms 1990, Quote:
'FOB means that the seller fulfils his obligation to delivery when the goods have passed
over the ship's rail at the named port of shipment. This means that the buyer has to bear
all the costs and risks of loss or of damage to the goods from that point'." [Ref. 27]
In the context of bunker delivery, transfer of custody means that the risk of loss or
damage to the bunkers is passed from the fuel supplier to the ship. It does not involve a
change of title to the good. Indeed, if the bunkers have not been paid for by the ship
operator, the legal title will still be with the supplier even though the custody is now in
the hands of the buyer.
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Custody transfer has nothing to do with sampling at the bunker's barge manifold
or the ship's bunker manifold. The position of custody transfer depends on the terms of
the contract and will result in only one unique location where an umpire sample will be
taken.
3.2.2 SHIPBOARD FUEL ANALYSIS
Many ships carry fuel test kits for onboard fuel testing and these can, when used
correctly, be reasonably accurate. Certainly, these kits, one being the FUELAB ocean
fleets fuel and lubricating oil test kit can give an early indication of potential problems
and may be used to perform tests on the following.
" Density
" Pour Point
* Viscosity Measurement
" Water Content
" Salt Water Determination
* Compatibility/Stability Rating
" Catalytic Fine Detection
" Sludge/Wax Determination
" Microbe (for distillate fuel)
If the supplied fuel does not conform to the requested quality specifications, then
the master will issue a letter of protest and note any deficiencies [see Appendix 4].
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3.2.3 SHORE-BASED LABORATORY FUEL ANALYSIS
"Recognised fuel analysis laboratories can provide accurate test results quickly
and give the ship information and guidance on pre-heating requirements, the set up of
centrifuges, and an early indication of potential fuel handling and fuel combustion
problems. The major laboratories associated with the classification societies, such as
DNVPS and Lloyd's FOBAS, also offer detailed technical advice and additional
guidance at relatively short notice. They can also provide critical information by fax by
way of bunker alerts." [Ref. 1, 2000]
A fuel analysis report shows the typical data of the fuel and assesses conformance
with the limits of the individual properties listed in ISO 8217 for the grade. In case of
deficiencies advice is given on what to do with the fuel, whether it is fit for use under
specific precautions. Also, the specific energy content of the fuel and the CCAI are
calculated and reported. "Because ships normally need a few days to consume the
remainder of the previous bunkering, results on the sample are usually at hand before the
new batch is due for consumption. This gives the ship operator a chance to consult his
technical department and the supplier for advice how to proceed in case the fuel is found
out of spec." [Ref. 6, 1997]
3.3 LOSS PREVENTION AND COLLECTING EVIDENCE
Quantity disputes are a problem which buyers can tackle. Things to watch out are:
* Correctness of calibration tables.
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" Ensure that actual measurements are done by the crew from the receiving vessel, and
that they report the measurements to the head office.
" Note the temperature at the time of measuring and make sure it matches what is on
the delivery receipt.
Quality disputes are unfortunately unavoidable, and dealing with this issue, goes
much along the same lines as the quantity dispute. Preventive medicine is the most
important feature. What is then the prescription?
" Be selective in choosing a supplier.
" Always test the fuel.
* Do not use the new fuel before test result is available.
* Avoid mix of new fuel with old fuel in the same tank(s).
* Ensure that the samples taken are as representative as possible and that they are
properly labelled (They are the sole evidence of the fuel the vessel has received).
3.3.1 ROUTINE EVIDENCE COLLECTION
It is critical that all activities during the bunker operation are properly recorded.
To enable the shipowner to document each step of the bunkering operation, those
onboard the ship should record and retain
" Details of which tanks have been loaded and in what order they were loaded
" Details of fuel oil already onboard the ship, its location and specification
* Bunker calculations, including temperature coefficients and tank volume calculations
" Bunker loading plans and daily work plans
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" Minutes of inter-departmental management meetings particularly regarding crew
requirements, cargo operations and stability implications
" Deck and engine room oil record books duly completed in accordance with MARPOL
international regulations
* Engine room log books
* Deck log books
" Engine room work books and record books
* Scrap or rough log books
" Bunker delivery receipts and details of previously loaded bunkers
" Shipboard bunker history - records of previous bunker loading operations
" Copies of any notice of protest which may have been issued during this or the
previous bunker loading
" At least one sample of the bunkers taken at the most recent previous bunker operation
and any other bunkers remaining onboard (ROB)
" List of personnel involved in the bunkering operation
* List of personnel present during routine sampling
* Laboratory fuel analysis reports of previous bunkering samples
* Shipboard fuel analysis reports. [Ref. 1, 2000]
3.3.2 NON-ROUTINE EVIDENCE COLLECTION
Where it is suspected that sub-standard bunkers have been supplied to the ship,
the ship operator should immediately take steps to ensure that accurate records are kept
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detailing which tanks have been supplied with the suspect fuel oil and arrangements
should be made to obtain the following evidence from the ship
" Evidence from the ship's bunker capacity
" Ship's general arrangement plan
* Ship's fuel oil pre-heating system drawings
* Ship's fuel oil pipeline diagrams
" Tank calibration tanks
" Relevant extracts from engine manuals and shipboard procedure manuals relating to
treatment of fuel oil. [Ref 1, 2000]
3.3.3 EVIDENCE IN THE EVENT OF BURNING SUSPECT/PROBLEMATIC
FUEL OIL
In case of main or auxiliary engine damage which is considered to be fuel related
it is essential that detailed written accounts of the incident are made. Additional fuel
samples taken from the fuel system should be correctly labelled with dates, times,
locations and signed by the chief engineer. Any engine components which have been
removed from service due to damage are to be retained on board and correctly labelled
for future reference. Photographs of damaged or defective parts taken with a camera
which records date and time would be useful. It is advised that charterers and fuel
suppliers are advised immediately of any potential claim with respect to fuel quality. If
the laboratory fuel oil analysis shows the fuel to be out of specification, charterers and
fuel suppliers should be immediately advised.
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3.4 CLAIMS MANAGEMENT
3.4.1 DISPUTES AND CLAIMS
The purpose of developing and using fuel management policies and procedures is
to reduce risk. The aim should be to minimise commercial loss. By following good
procedures, an owner or charterer should be in a position to quickly identify a problem
and take appropriate action to mitigate the situation. If a fuel buyer, shipowner or
manager wishes to pursue a claim for shortage or poor quality, it is essential that good
reliable evidence is provided. If the procedures outlined above are followed, such
evidence will be available and dispute resolution should be greatly facilitated. It is
suggested that if quality or quantity problems are experienced, attempts should be made
to resolve the problem by discussions between all the parties involved. All those
concerned should have an interest in minimising cost associated with the problem. If this
fails, mediation is recommended before high costs of arbitration and court proceedings
are incurred.
3.4.2 DECISION TO DEBUNKER
If a fuel is 'out of specification' it does not necessarily mean that the fuel is
'unsuitable for use'. We often have situations when the density or viscosity is exceeded
from that ordered by the charterer, shipowner or whomsoever is purchasing the fuel.
When specifications are contravened, technical advice is normally offered and heeded by
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most prudent operators. If the out of specification product can be handled effectively by
taking corrective actions to the handling of the fuel through the purification system and
other engine room equipment, and, can be used without incident, then the issue becomes
one of cost differential rather than the belligerent response of 'DEBUNKER, IT
CONTRAVENES THE ISO SPEC ORDERED'. Common sense thus prevails.
Normally under these conditions, the fuel purchaser requests the fuel supplier reduce the
original cost of the product to reflect the actual quality supplied. Under these scenarios
no legal issues ensue and the matter is normally considered dealt with. [Ref. 5, June
2000]
"On the other hand, there are also other 'off specification' fuel oils that are both
outside of the specification AND outside of the ability of the pre-treatment plant and the
main engine and generators to contend with, without severe mechanical damage or
handling difficulties AND outside of the realm of the engineering staff onboard the vessel
to handle. Many prudent shipping companies, when confronted with these problems, will
debunker the fuel oil irrespective of whether they will eventually suffer financial loss due
to the inability to demonstrate that the fuel at the time of supply was compliant or non
compliant with specifications. The legal problems ensuing when these type of actions
occur, can be simplified by taking prudent actions to support any eventual legal claim."
[Ref. 5, June 2000]
"Where it is unclear whether or not the ship can use the bunkers supplied, the
shipowner should evaluate carefully the risks of doing so. The shipowner should
consider whether, in light of the information to hand, it could be considered reasonable to
go to the time and expense of debunkering the fuel or to attempt to use the fuel (because
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the risk of damage or difficulty using the fuel is small). Factors that should be considered
when making this evaluation include
" Whether there is a risk of damage and/or excessive wear to the ship's machinery
* Whether the ship's performance might be inhibited
" Whether the ship can heat the fuel to obtain the correct injection viscosity."
[Ref. 1, 2000]
3.5 UNANNOUNCED BUNKER AUDITS AND ACCREDITATION SCHEME
FOR BUNKER SUPPLIERS
In view of a) owners' and ship's crew duty to ensure a safe, efficient and
environmentally friendly bunkering operation as per international law and industry
practice, as well as to have in place fuel management processes conforming to ISM, ISO
requirements, b) the very high prices of bunkers making this cost the largest single item
of voyage expenses and c) the errors or omissions observed and or likely to be made in
the gauging of vessel's and barge bunker tanks, which have a direct effect on quantity
discrepancy and associated losses/disputes, a number of shipping companies have
decided to implement unannounced bunker audits effective immediately.
Foregoing regulatory regimes establish limits related to fuel oil burning with a
view to avoiding unreasonable wastage of resources (over-consumption) and to reduce
the impact of emissions: CO2 and Particles, SOx, NOx and furthermore, apart from safety
and pollution prevention procedures connected with bunker handling and transfer
operations, they define the requirements to be met by bunker suppliers.
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A fundamental principle of quality management of the ISO rules is that of
continual improvement by means, among other tools, of audits and corrective/preventive
action to identify opportunities to improve the effectiveness of the management system.
In this context companies wish to establish measurable quality objectives at functional
levels, monitor vessels' performance and take actions to make improvements.
As previously stated, the success of any bunker quality or quantity dispute will
depend upon the quality of evidence collected in support of the claim. The collection of
evidences, when in fact integrated into shipboard procedures related to ISM, ISO
requirements, need not be onerous. In other words by ensuring that the shipboard
procedures, requiring all aspects of the bunkering operation to be properly documented
and accurate records to be maintained, are satisfied can at the same time serve and
strengthen a vessel's position in the event of a claim.
It is worth mentioning here that ever since steam replaced sail, it has been the
practice of many engineers to keep some reserve bunkers on board. Chief Engineers
must now be absolutely honest about every last drop of bunkers onboard, be meticulous
in detailing the inter-tank transfers of bunkers, the pumping of any oily residues into
sludge tank, accurate measurement and determination of bunkers lifted - taking into
consideration all factors affecting the accuracy of calculations, i.e. soundings, ullages,
density, temperatures, volumes, trim and list correction, availability of volume correction
and temperature correction tables, detection of presence and assessment of water etc.
The ship's bunker records and bunker surveys at each port and specifically prior to
and after bunkering operations have now become very important to satisfy the
requirements of quality management system in general and of proper vessel's bunker
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management system in particular, as well as to be used as a defence to bunker quantity
disputes and when it comes to tankers to rebut oil cargo shortage claims.
It is finally recognised that the vast majority of bunker transfers (supply) are
undertaken by reputable operators and physical suppliers, but owners and their sea staff
must be alert, particularly now when prices of bunkers are high, to the fact that there are
some disreputable operators which are familiar with many tricks and deceptions and are
prepared to use them on any unsuspecting receivers.
By following correct shipboard procedures and by implementing unannounced
remaining onboard bunker (ROB) audits simultaneously with regular bunker survey, if
such bunker survey is being conducted, companies look forward to address the principles
of quality management system and avoid any irregularities of quality and any quantity
discrepancy incidents/claims.
Looking from the bunker suppliers' point of view, the Maritime and Port
Authority of Singapore (MPA) have recently announced the implementation of an
accreditation scheme for bunker suppliers. This of course is welcomed by the industry as
a whole, as Singapore is the largest bunkering port in the world, which resulted in a
number of quality and quantity disputes in the past. "As announced at the Singapore
International Bunkering Conference (SIBCON 2002) in September 2002, together with
the Singapore Shipping Association (SSA), MPA has developed an accreditation scheme
for bunker suppliers. MPA will implement the accreditation scheme from 1s' June 2003.
All bunker suppliers will be given up to two years to attain accreditation qualifications.
The annual renewal of the bunkering licence will be subject to the suppliers achieving the
accreditation qualifications. The objective of the accreditation is to recognise good
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bunker suppliers and deter malpractice in the industry, through the following
accreditation qualifications: a) minimum paid-up capital, b) Quality Management for
Bunker Supply Chain (QMBS) and c) Key Performance Indicators (KPI)." [Ref. 33, May
2003]
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4 EU SHIP EMISSIONS TO AIR
4.1 THE NEED TO REDUCE ATMOSPHERIC EMISSIONS IN EUROPE
The ecosystems of Northwest Europe have long been subject to high levels of
acid deposition as a result of sulphur emissions. With industry reducing harmful
emissions over the past 10 years and with further clean up plans already in place, it was
inevitable that the shipping industry would be brought into focus as an emissions source.
"Various studies on sulphur pollution show that in 1990 sulphur emissions from
ships contributed around 4% to the total in Europe. Today that figure represents around
12% and it is predicted could be as much as 18% by 2010. Put into real terms the total
SO, emissions from international shipping in the North Sea was calculated to be 439,000
tonnes per annum in 1990." [Ref. 22, June 2000]
"The European air mass is a complex dynamic meteorological system influenced
by both maritime and land mass effects. 'European waters' regarded as relevant in this
respect are depicted in the map below [see Figure 4.1]. These are divided into the
following sea areas: the Baltic (1), the North and Irish Sea (2), the Mediterranean (3) and
the N E Atlantic (4), in accordance with MARPOL definitions, with the exception of the
N E Atlantic, which has a more arbitrary definition. The North Sea area defined here is
an expansion to that proposed in IMO doc. MP/CONF.3/16 (July 1997), for a North Sea
SOx Emission Control Area (SECA)." [Ref. 2, August 2000]
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Ceilings (NEC). Until recently [see Paragraph 4.2], seagoing ships were
exempted from existing EU air quality legislation, including the NEC directive,
and marine heavy fuel oils have not been subject to EU environmental legislation.
The result is that ships' contribution to EU emissions is rising. Preliminary
projections suggest it is quite possible that by 2010, ship emissions of sulphur
dioxide could have reached three quarters of land emissions. For nitrogen oxides,
the figure is probably nearer 60%. This scenario is illustrated in figure 4.2 below.
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"The European Commission has recently let a new study contract to quantify ship
emissions more precisely, based on year 2000 ship movements, and including in-
port emissions for the first time." [Ref. 29, January 2001]
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Figure 4.2: Ship and land-based emissions in 2010. [Ref. 29, January 2001]
The reason SO, is the focus of these discussions is that it is dependent upon the
quality of the fuel oil and in particular its sulphur content. This is illustrated in the
following table.
Table 4.1: The pollutants and their source. [Ref. 3, March 2000]
Emission particle Legislated by IMO Source
SOx Function of fuel oil sulphur content.
CO2  X Function of combustion.
CO X Function of the air excess ratio, combustion
temperature and air/fuel mixture.
HC X Very engine dependent but a function of the amount
of fuel and lube oil left unburned during combustion.
Smoke/Particulates X Originates from unburned fuel, ash content in fuel
and lube oil.
NOx Function of peak combustion temperatures, oxygen
content and residence time.
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"Furthermore, SO 2 emissions from ships contribute to acid deposition and
particulate formation. S02 is a particular priority because ship emissions of S02 have
been found to be much higher per tonne kilometre than other transport modes [see Figure
4.3]. High SO2 emissions are a direct result of the high sulphur content of marine heavy
fuel oil. The only way to reduce emissions is to lower the sulphur content of the fuel or
to install exhaust scrubbing equipment onboard ships." [Ref. 29, January 2001]
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Figure 4.3: SO 2 emissions per mode. [Ref. 29, January 2001]
4.2 IMO AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
MARPOL 73/78 Annex VI on air pollution from ships was adopted by a
Diplomatic Conference hosted by the International Maritime Organisation in 1997 and
is valid for international and territorial waters. The Annex VI implies a maximum
worldwide sulphur content of 4.5 %m/m in fuels and a maximum permitted SOx
emission level in the Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the English Channel. Fuel sulphur
content for these areas must not exceed 1.5 %m/m, except if the vessel is equipped with
an approved 'exhaust gas cleaning system or any other technological method' to meet
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the maximum SOx emission level. The Annex enters into force internationally one year
after it has been ratified by at least 15 countries representing 50% of the gross tonnage
of the world's merchant shipping. Current signatories to MARPOL Annex VI are
Norway, Singapore, Sweden, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, the Bahamas, Denmark and
Bangladesh; representing 26.27% of the world's merchant tonnage. The remaining EU
countries represent approximately 10% of the world tonnage and candidate countries a
further 10% (notably Malta at 5% and Cyprus at 4%). As long as the entry into force
mechanism remains 15 countries and 50% world tonnage, entry into force will depend
upon ratification by the major open registers such as Panama (with 17% world
tonnage). "The Bahamas' recent ratification is encouraging in this respect" [Ref. 29,
January 2001], but even if, for example, Panama were to ratify, a further 6 states would
be required to meet the 15 country criterion. The relevant regulations referred to are
Regulations 14 and 18 and these regulations must be read together to gain the full
meaning and intention of the rules as presented [see Appendix 5].
The EU Directive 1999/32/EC entered into force in May 1999 and EU member
states were requested to implement the Directive into their legislation no later than 1 July
2000. As part of this Directive, Marine Gas Oil/Distillate Fuels (covering all 'DM'
distillates according to Table 1 of ISO 8217:1996) must not have a sulphur content of
more than 0.20 %m/m from 01 July 2000 onwards. The above EU Council Directive
implies that marine gas oil/distillate fuels having a sulphur content exceeding the 0.20
%m/m limit are not allowed in the EU territorial waters (i.e. 12 mile zone). The use of
low sulphur marine gas oil/distillate fuels is not applicable to vessels entering the EU
from a destination outside the EU. Regardless of the vessel's destination from an EU
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port, low sulphur fuel is required within the EU (12 mile) territorial waters. The
important issue here is that the buying party of the fuel has the responsibility of ordering
the correct grades. Note that Belgium has not only restricted the use of high Sulphur gas
oil fuel, but also has forbidden the sale of this fuel grade. Further reduction of sulphur
content for marine gas oil/distillate fuels to 0.10 % m/m has been set and targeted to take
effect on 01 January 2008.
On 2 2 "d November 2002, the EU has amended Directive 1999/32/EC to include
the heavy fuel oil grades. More importantly, after much discussion, it has been decided
that the set limits will be in line with those set by IMO. Thus the proposal aims to
"introduce a 1.5% sulphur limit for marine fuels used by all seagoing vessels in the North
Sea, English Channel and Baltic Sea, in line with MARPOL Annex VI sulphur limits, in
order to reduce the effect of ship emissions on acidification in Northern Europe and on
air quality." [Ref 28, November 2002] "Member States shall take all necessary steps to
ensure that from 31 December 2010, marine fuels are not used in the areas of their
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones outside SOx Emission Control Areas if the
sulphur content of those fuels exceeds 1.5% by mass. This shall apply to all vessels of all
flags, including vessels whose journey began outside the Community." [Ref 28,
November 2002]
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4.3 OPTIONS FOR REDUCING SHIP ATMOSPHERIC EMISSIONS
As previously discussed [see Paragraph 4.1], the two possible ways of reducing
the SO, emissions would be to lower the sulphur content of the fuel or to install exhaust
scrubbing equipment onboard ships.
In the report from the Brussels meeting on air pollution held on the 18 1h January
2002, when asked: "Do you believe the Commission should support the use of flue gas
desulphurisation (scrubbing) equipment as an alternative to lower sulphur fuels? What, if
any measures, could the Community promote in this respect?" The following answer was
given.
INTERTANKO/INTERCARGO explained why this should not be pursued.
Legislation should ensure international legislation to deliver to ships what is considered
environmental friendly and generally readily available. Scrubbers would only move the
sulphur (solid) deposition into the marine ocean environment - thus no positive gain to
the general environmental picture. Summing up - Annex VI needs to be implemented
and the standards set.
4.3.1 LOW SULPHUR FUEL OIL AVAILABILITY
Given the proposal to limit sulphur content to 1.5 %m/m it is necessary to address
the production and supply problems associated with such a proposal.
"ISO 8217 gives a maximum limit for most of the fuel oil grades of 5.0% m/m,
but in reality no more than a fraction of one percent of the marine oil fuels as currently
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supplied exceeds the 4.5% m/m value." [Ref. 23, October 1999] "More typically these
grades of fuels would contain approximately 2.7% sulphur." [Ref. 7, September 2001]
"ABS Oil Testing Sevices data shows the global cap of 4.5% to affect a small
percentage (1 to 2%) of the residual fuel oil used by ships. Whereas, the 1.5% cap set for
the SECAs would represent a 15% of the residual fuel oil availability." [Ref. 5, June
2000] ABS took some of their historical fuel testing data and divided the samples into
viscosity categories on fuel oils that had 1.5% sulphur or less in them. "There is a
significant portion of these fuels that are in the heavy fuel categories. "The shipowner
then may not need to necessarily burn diesel fuel to comply with the lower levels of
sulphur required by the SECAs and thus the financial impact of so doing can be
lessened." [Ref 5, June 2000] Having said that, one should keep in mind this is a portion
of the 15% of the fuel tested by ABS, which is not necessarily located at the SECAs.
"Less than 4% of today's bunker fuel deliveries fall below the 1.5% limit. Low-sulphur
fuel oil is available, but most of this is today consumed in the inland markets. If shipping
requires such fuel, it will need to compete with inland users for the relatively small
amounts available." [Ref. 12, 1999]
Given the amount and type of sulphur required to be removed from the
residue fuel oils, namely approximately 1.2%, to meet the proposed sulphur
capping requirements, the capital/investment cost of infrastructure required, the
cost of manufacture of the 'treatment' gas (possibly a hydrogen enriched stream
as explained above) and the alternative uses available for this gas, and the
expected price that the market would be willing to pay for such a residue fuel oil,
then it is to be considered that a refinery would not find it cost effective to supply
45
such a material and use the residues from primary refining to manufacture
alternative products which could attract premium value (alternative use of scarce
resources). As an example, such an alternative process to use the residual feed
stock could be by Coking to manufacture, amongst other hydrocarbon products,
LNG for polymer production or domestic fuel supply. [Ref. 7, September 2001]
Clearly a limited supply of residual fuels could be manufactured by use of the
residues from sweet crude oils (those crude oil containing limited or low sulphur content)
where the treatment process to remove sulphur would not be so demanding. However,
supplies of such crude oils are limited and they do dictate a premium value that would
drive up the price of the final residue fuel oil. Current estimates suggest that the price
increase for the production of lower sulphur fuels to meet a 1.5% sulphur cap could be as
much as $80 per tonne.
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Figure 4.4: Cost curve showing the price premium for EU refiners to provide 1.5%
sulphur marine fuel, against a current average content of 2.9%. [Ref. 25, April 2002]
Related to availability is the question regarding the method of controlling the
sulphur limit. It would appear cost effective and more easily enforceable if requirements,
or at least control, were applied at the point of delivery. Rather than a total ban on
marketing of "normal" sulphur oil in the EU, this might only oblige the bunker suppliers
to deliver oil of specified sulphur content when required. "The registration of suppliers is
to be undertaken by the 'appropriate authority' of each country and is to ensure that the
supplier's duties under the Annex regulations are met. In terms of fuel composition, the
requirements of ISO 8217 are largely followed." [Ref 24, Spring 2003] A total ban also
covering oil which might be sold for use outside the SECA or other requirement area
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could have serious and unwanted repercussions on the European and global bunker
market and consequently for the shipping sector.
To conclude, therefore, it is believed that both the current Directive will lead to
market shortage or alternatively a significant increase in value for purchase such that it
would have a major impact upon the extent and cost of Maritime trading within European
waters.
4.3.2 OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS FOR VESSELS
Vessels are designed and constructed with a limited number of dedicated
fuel oil tanks that are of sufficient size and capacity to meet the expected trading
demands of the vessel and the rate of consumption of the diverse fuels required by
the vessel. As an aside, but being part of the general fuel oil logistical problems
for a vessel, it should be stated that there is currently international debate
requiring these tanks to be protectively located such that in the event of rupture to
the vessel's hull the content of these tanks would not create pollution.
With the future introduction of the MARPOL Annex VI regulations a
secondary set of specifications would have to be considered by voyage planners,
namely, is the vessel entering a SOx Control Zone and if so, for how long and
what bunker tonnage is required to transit this zone. In addition to this logistical
problem and depending upon the length of time for the transit, the vessel may
have to change the content of its sole cylinder lube oil tank, such that it becomes
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compatible with the lower sulphur content fuel being burnt. [Ref. 7, September
2001]
Thus, with the introduction of these regulations a bunker tank capacity problem
may arise together with the possible requirement for the installation of a secondary
cylinder lube oil tank, so that there is a smooth transition between the use of fuel types.
The MARPOL Regulation requires that the changeover to the lower sulphur fuel
will be undertaken with sufficient time before entry in the control area such that all the
fuel system is adequately flushed of all fuel residues that exceed the 1.5% maximum
limit. The date, time and position of the completion of the fuel change-over, together
with the volume of the lower sulphur fuel onboard, has to be recorded in the logbook as
prescribed by the Flag State. Clearly, the practicalities of flushing both the settling and
daily/service tanks will take some time (days) before entry into the control area could be
contemplated under the regulations.
"The above mentioned problems may deter owners from placing their vessels in a
European trading pattern which, in turn, could impact or disrupt the balance of the EU
economy until adequate recompense/incentive for the capital (installation of required
bunker infrastructure onboard) and operational (increased prices for the purchase of the
lower sulphur bunkers) investment is available." [Ref. 7, September 2001]
The documentary evidence that the vessel will have to maintain to supply
evidence of concurring with the diverse requirements and regulations could be large. The
International specifications for bunkers are not compliant with the EU requirements and
therefore additional and special bunker receipts would be required.
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The bunker receipts requirement applies to all fuel oils supplied for use
onboard the receiving ship. As a minimum, the supplier and supplied parties are
to be clearly identified, the product type and quantity are to be stated and the
actual density and sulphur content values, as determined by the relevant ISO test
methods, are to be given. Furthermore, the supplier is to declare that the fuel as
supplied to the ship is in accordance with the requirements of Regulations 14 and
18. These bunker receipts are to be retained onboard for a minimum of three
years from the date of delivery and are to be available for inspection by the
relevant authorities as required. These bunker receipts will be the primary means
by which a ship will demonstrate compliance with the relevant sections of
Regulations 14 and 18. However, to underpin the fuel quality statements given on
the receipt, it is to be accompanied by a ship retained fuel sample drawn in
accordance with IMO's Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC)
criteria. [Ref. 23, Spring 2003]
"In any case, procedures will need to be developed to ensure compliance
with the requirements of Annex VI and staff will need to be trained in its
application. This applies to both shipowners and suppliers. The implications are
far reaching and if ratified, as anticipated, it is time for shipping to prepare for a
whole new bunkering regime." [Ref 14, May 2003]
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5. FLUCTUATING BUNKER PRICES AND DAILY FREIGHT
RATES
As stated at the very beginning of the thesis, 50-60% of the total running costs of
a commercial vessel is accrued to the cost of bunkers. This is an average approximate
percentage estimated by shipping companies. It would be interesting to see how daily
revenues of a tanker are affected by the fluctuating bunker prices.
To begin with, indicative key routes and rates of the tanker industry are selected.
In particular, the a) VLCC 250,000 deadweight Arabian Gulf - Japan, b) Suezmax
130,000 deadweight West Africa - USA East Coast, c) Aframax 90,000 deadweight
North Sea - Europe, d) Clean product carrier 30,000 deadweight Caribbean - USA East
Coast and e) Clean product carrier 33,000 deadweight Europe - USA East Coast routes
are to be considered.
Due to lack of data on bunker prices for any date prior to 3 1st August 2001, the
author will look into the freight rates from the 3 1 " August 2001 till the 3 0th May 2003.
The recession period till the end of 2002 might have been strongly affected by bunker
prices, and may have been damaging to shipping companies, had bunker prices been
fairly high.
Bunker prices for the ports of interest are projected graphically in figures 5.1 and
5.2. The daily freight rates for the same period of both the crude and the product tanker
spot market are shown in figures 5.3 and 5.4.
To assess how much of the daily freight rate is used to finance the burning of fuel
oil the following assumptions need to be made so that the graphs produced from now
onwards are significant. Firstly, at an optimal speed of 14 knots the daily fuel oil
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consumption at sea for each vessel is as follows: a) VLCC, 73 metric tonnes per day; b)
Suezmax, 55 metric tonnes per day; c) Aframax, 45 metric tonnes per day and d) Clean
Product, 30 metric tonnes per day. The bunkering ports for each route are: a) Fujairah for
VLCCs; b) Las Palmas/Tenerife for Suezmaxes; c) Rotterdam for Aframaxes; d) Aruba
for the Clean Product, Caribbean to the USA East Coast and e) Rotterdam for the Clean
Product, Europe to the USA East Coast. Finally, it is assumed that on the day that a
vessel is chartered, it will receive its fuel from the loading port and will consume this for
the rest of the voyage. For example, if a Suezmax is to be loaded from West Africa to
unload at the US East Coast, it will load its bunkers from Las Palmas/Tenerife at the
current day price. Thus, at a given freight rate, the bunkering cost is deducted for that
same date [see Figures 5.5 & 5.6]. This of course would be the effective freight rate less
the bunkers cost per sea day per se, rather than the bunkers component of voyage costs
per day, that is including port days. Moreover, this is not a realistic view of what ship
operators do., In practice, shipping companies have developed models, in the form of an
optimum bunkering plan, to minimise bunkering cost [see Chapter 7].
Let us now see what percentage of the daily freight rate is composed of the
bunkers cost. On average the bunkering cost is about 40% of the daily freight rate, thus
according to the statement that 50-60% of the running cost is accrued to bunkers, up to
80% of the daily freight rate is used to finance the total running costs [see Figures 5.7 and
5.8]. Had the bunker prices increased by $80 per tonne, as stated in Paragraph 4.3.1, in
order to meet the low sulphur fuel oil demand, the bunkering cost would on average have
made up around 65% of the daily freight rate [see Figures 5.9 and 5.10].
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Bunker price development 2001-2003
USD/tonne, IFO 380 cSt
i .1 1. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 5.1: Rotterdam, Las Palmas, Fujairah Bunker Price Development 2001-2003.
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Figure 5.2: Singapore, New York, Aruba Bunker Price Development 2001-2003.
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Figure 5.3: Tanker Spot Market - Daily Freight Rates 2001-2003.
Figure 5.4: Product Spot Market - Daily Freight Rates 2001-2003.
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Figure 5.5: Tankers: Daily Freight Rates less Bunkering Cost 2001-2003.
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Figure 5.6: Products: Daily Freight Rates less Bunkering Cost 2001-2003.
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Figure 5.7: Tankers: Percentage of Bunkering Cost to Daily Freight Rate 2001-2003.
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Figure 5.8: Products: Percentage of Bunkering Cost to Daily Freight Rate 2001-2003.
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Figure 5.9: Tankers: Percentage of Bunkering Cost to Daily Freight Rate after
Ratification of Annex VI @ $80/tonne premium.
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Figure 5.10: Products: Percentage of Bunkering Cost to Daily Freight Rate after
Ratification of Annex VI @ $80/tonne premium.
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6 BUNKER PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT
6.1 THE WORLD BUNKER MARKET
Marine fuel oil prices follow the basic forces of the market, based on the balance
of supply and demand. Costs of raw material (crude oil), production, transport and
storage have, of course, some influence. There is, however, little use to bring such into a
formula because the aforementioned parameters can easily be overruled by market forces.
It is usually uneconomic to buy and process crude oil with the aim to produce
marine fuel oil. Due to the fact that fuel oil prices are persistently below those of crude
oil [see figure 6.1], it is in the economic interest of every refiner to squeeze out as many
high value products, and to dispose of the residue as good as market forces allow.
In consequence, actual marine fuel oil prices are depending on crude oil prices,
transport costs, the local or regional supply and demand situation, political and fiscal
impacts, and -last but not least- the global economy: In boom times, more ships sail
faster, and more marine fuel oil is burnt in consequence.
Generally speaking, at the time being fuel oil on a global basis is not short and
will not be so in the foreseeable future. Power generation on shore has alternatives
(nuclear, coal and gas) and will change to these when profitable; thus the shipping world
can rely on this. Although marine bunkers are bought and sold in almost every port in the
world, the world bunker market can be broadly divided into three major regional markets
in which the bulk of physical bunkering activities take place. These markets are
Singapore, Rotterdam and Houston. However, supply and demand patterns are shifting
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on a long term basis. The ARA (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Antwerp) region has lost its
role as the No.1 bunker place to Singapore almost 15 years ago and during recent years
Fujairah lost its chance to fight for the pole position. The US Gulf and West Coast had a
boom in the 80s, but at the moment they serve mostly as regional markets. Closure of
refineries or fiscal and environmental restrictions may eliminate a bunkering place.
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Figure 6.1: Ratio of Heavy Fuel Oil/Crude Oil Prices during recent Years. [Ref. 6, 1997]
Two observations can be made when looking at historical bunker prices [see
Figure 5.1 and 5.2]. First, it can be seen that although bunker prices move together in the
long run, there are short term deviations between prices. As previously mentioned, the
long run co-movements of bunker prices can be attributed to the fact that bunker prices
are closely related to the world oil prices. "The short run deviations between prices in
different ports are mainly due to the regional supply and demand imbalances." [Ref 15,
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2002] Second, there are large fluctuations and high volatility in bunker prices, as they
are linked to world oil prices, therefore shocks and large swings in the world oil market
can directly affect the world bunker market. Furthermore, daily price movements can be
quite hectic due to local demand and availability imbalances, but this may also be a result
of expectations. In the case of an expected price increase, everybody strives to close a
deal early on, otherwise, when prices are expected to drop, everybody waits till the last
minute.
6.2 HEDGING BUNKER PRICE RISK
In general, risk may be defined as a circumstance, action, situation or event
(CASE) with the ability or potential to impact the key dependencies that support the core
processes of the organisation. Figure 6.2 illustrates the context within which risks arise;
the relationship between the mission, corporate objectives, stakeholder expectations and
core processes. "Risks can be divided into three types or categories of risk. These three
types of risk are related and (sometimes) inter-dependent. They are:
1. Hazard risks;
2. Control risks; and
3. Opportunity risks." [Ref 9, 2002]
Hazard risks are the CASE that can only inhibit achievement of the corporate
mission. Typically these are insurable type risks or perils and will include fire, storm,
flood, injury etc. The discipline of risk management has strong origins in the
management and control of hazard risks. Control risks are the CASE that cause doubt
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about the ability of the organisation to achieve the mission. Internal financial control
protocols are a good example of a response to a control risk. If the protocols are
removed, then there is no way of being certain what will happen. Opportunity risks are
the CASE that are often deliberately accepted by the organisation. These risks are
pursued by the organisation in order to enhance the achievement of the mission, although
they can sometimes inhibit the achievement of the mission, if the outcome is adverse.
This is the most important type of risk for the future success of any organisation.
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Figure 6.2: Risks in Context. [Ref. 9, 2002]
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Note that a risk can be one type in certain circumstances but another type
when those circumstances change. Risks change from one type to another within
the organisation dependent on circumstances. In certain circumstances, an
opportunity risk may become a control risk or even a hazard risk.
There are three styles of risk management based on the type of risk under
consideration. A particular risk could be a hazard risk, control risk or opportunity
risk in different organisations, or in the same organisation at different times. To
gain maximum benefit from a risk, the organisation should, where possible, seek
to shift the risk towards opportunity status. There is no single style of risk
management or approach to risk management that offers all the answers. Clearly,
the various styles that can be adopted should operate as complementary
approaches within an organisation. The integrative approach to risk management
accepts that the organisation must tolerate certain hazard risks and must have an
appetite for opportunity risks. Risk management tools and techniques should be
brought to bear whereby the range of possible outcomes is shifted as follows:
" hazard management limits the negativity of the outcome
" control management reduces the range of outcomes
* opportunity management makes outcomes more positive [Ref. 9, 2002]
In view of the aforementioned, a shipping company faces the challenge to
properly manage the intrinsic risk of fluctuating bunker prices as suited at any given point
in time. Ideally, one should seek to shift the risk towards opportunity status, but today's
shipping world perceives bunker price risk management as a hazard management tool or
in some cases as a control management instrument.
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Bunker price risk management is an issue that needs to be debated across the
whole business - it is not solely a purchasing matter. In determining price exposures it is
necessary to look at how revenues are set. A shipping company's finance group may
want to provide predictable returns, thus it is in the company's interest to safeguard its
margin assumptions by off-laying exposures to variable bunkers cost as soon as a
contract is won. When making budget assumptions, a company may have bunker price
escalators in its contracts or an extra 'what if factor is built in. Known bunker costs
could turn bunker price management to a company's commercial advantage, by allowing
it to be more aggressive in bidding for contracts. Moreover, a company could gain a
marketing advantage by offering its customers price stability.
Despite the benefits of hedging, only a limited number of shipping and bunker
companies hedge, even fewer hedge their entire price exposure. At present the
convention is to hedge between 40% and 60% of their exposure over the current financial
year plus one. The main reason these companies hedge a fraction of their risk is that they
want to benefit should the market move in their favour. They are worried of being left at
a disadvantage to their competitors. A lack of knowledge about derivatives means that
many companies are unaware of the tools available to them, or the potential of the
derivatives. The derivative market continues to develop. In the past, the swaps market in
particular lacked competition and liquidity. This has subsequently improved -
particularly for longer dated products. Spreads have narrowed, although there are
inconsistencies and inefficiencies for some of the more unusual products, and less active
regions.
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6.3 HEDGING BUNKER PRICE FLUCTUATIONS USING FUTURES
CONTRACTS
Fuel oil futures contract were traded in the Singapore Exchange during the
period 1988 to 1992. However, trading was eventually stopped due to the low
trading volume. The International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) also launched a
bunker futures contract in January 1999. This also proved unsuccessful and the
contract was withdrawn after six months.
In the absence of bunker futures contracts, and because of the close
correlation between bunker prices and petroleum and petroleum derivatives
prices, fritures contracts on the latter commodities are alternative candidates for
bunker price risk management. Hedging against bunker price fluctuations using
futures contracts involves a cross-hedge against an existing crude or petroleum
futures product. [Ref. 15, 2002]
6.4 HEDGING BUNKER PRICES USING OTC PRODUCTS
Hedging bunker price fluctuations using futures contracts however means that
some degree of basis risk is usually borne by the user, as the contract does not cover his
full market exposure. In order to eliminate this basis risk between products and offer
greater flexibility, an active "Over The Counter" (OTC) market has developed. The vast
majority of bunker hedging is conducted in the OTC market in the form of swaps and
options (private agreements between counterparties). Hedging instruments in the OTC
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market can be tailored to suit the specific needs of the client in terms of price reference,
quantity and duration. The number of companies managing their exposure to movements
in the price of fuel oil has grown dramatically over the past few years with many sectors
of industry taking an interest in active hedging, from refiners and cement companies to
shipowners.
6.4.1 HEDGING BUNKER PRICES USING FORWARD CONTRACTS
A forward bunker contract is defined as an agreement between a seller and a
buyer to exchange a specified quantity of bunker of certain quality, at an agreed price, at
certain delivery location and time in the future. Forward contracts are usually paper
contracts in the sense that settlement is made on the difference between the contracted
price and the price for bunker at the delivery point, although physical deliveries are also
possible.
6.4.2 HEDGING BUNKER PRICES USING BUNKER SWAP CONTRACTS
Swaps are the backbone of the energy derivatives market. Their popularity is due
mainly to their simplicity. The structure of a basic or 'plain vanilla' energy swap differs
little from those in any other derivative market. A simple oil swap is an agreement
whereby a floating price is exchanged for a fixed price over a specified period for a
defined volume of oil. It is a financial arrangement, which involves no transfer of
physical oil. The difference between the floating price and fixed price is settled in cash
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for specific periods - usually monthly, but sometimes quarterly, six monthly or annually.
The contractual obligations are settled in cash. The net result, when combined with
transactions in the physical market, is that the shipowner pays the price he 'fixed' and the
bunker supplier receives the price at which he fixed, for the quantity of bunkers hedged.
Similar to the Swap contract, the Extendable swap is designed to fix the fuel oil
costs at a predefined level. However, in return for giving the bunker supplier the option
to extend the contract for another term at the same price, the shipowner is being offered a
significant discount from the standard swap.
In the Differential swap, the market player takes a position on the price difference
between two separate commodities. This mechanism is frequently used when hedging
one commodity on the futures market of another. Using, for example, the Gas oil
contract on the IPE to hedge exposure in bunkers. There is a high degree of correlation
between the price of gas oil and bunkers, and such a hedge would cover the basis risk. A
differential swap would then cover variants in the price of the two commodities. This
type of arrangement allows the user to take advantage of the liquidity of the listed futures
market and the specific risk cover of a swaps contract. This kind of arrangement reduces
the risk exposure of the market player. Whereas a standard swap is based on the
differential between fixed and floating prices, a Differential swap is based on the
difference between a fixed differential for two products, and the actual or floating
differential over time.
The Participation swap is designed to allow the shipowner to 'participate' in
bunker price protection much like a swap, while reducing the downside risk. The
participation of the swap provider is generally denoted in percentage. A 40%
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participation swap will mean that the swap provider gives the shipowner 40% of the total
benefit available by the downward movement of oil prices.
The Double up swap is another tool aimed at getting better terms and conditions
for the shipowner / bunker supplier. It involves the shipowner / bunker supplier selling a
swaption to the swap provider. Swaption is basically an option on a swap. In other
words, the swap provider buys an option to double the swap volume of oil before the
pricing period starts. The advantage to the shipowner / bunker supplier is that they can
achieve a swap price which is better than the prevailing market price. This is because the
premium earned by the shipowner on selling a swaption to the swap provider subsidises
the swap price.
6.4.3 HEDGING BUNKER PRICES USING OPTIONS
"Although option contracts had been used extensively for risk management in
energy markets since the early 1980s, it was not until the 1990s that options were first
used as a means of hedging bunker fuel risk in shipping. Nowadays, several financial
institutions and commodity trading houses offer numerous types of options on bunker
fuel to shipowners and shipping companies". [Ref. 15, 2002]
The Cap price agreement, also known as an Asian Option, protects the shipowner
from escalating prices, yet allows him/her to take advantage of price declines as well. An
index price is agreed upon by which the bunker cost in the marketplace is represented.
Whenever this index price moves above the agreed cap level, the bunker supplier pays
the shipowner the accrued difference in price. Much like a rebate, these payments from
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the bunker supplier offset the higher bunker cost in the marketplace, thereby limiting or
'capping' the shipowner's total bunker cost. When the index price is below the cap, no
payments or rebates are due from the supplier. A premium is being paid to the bunker
supplier to reflect this protection against rising prices. This premium varies according to
the contract length, cap price level and market conditions and can be paid at the start or
be spread over the life of the contract. In a similar but opposite manner, the bunker
supplier uses the Floor agreement to hedge himself against low bunker prices.
The Collar is designed to keep the bunker costs within an agreed range,
effectively putting a 'collar' around a shipowner's bunker price risk. An important
feature of a collar is that it requires no premium payment. With the collar, rather than
paying the bunker supplier a premium, the shipowner agrees to a minimum price, or
floor. Perhaps the most attractive feature of this structure is that it the only time a
shipowner effectively pays for this protection is when he/she can best afford it - when
prices are very low. An index price is agreed upon which the bunker cost in the
marketplace is represented. A cap and a floor price are selected to compose the collar, in
between which the shipowner bears the marketplace bunker price. Above the agreed cap
level, the bunker supplier pays the shipowner the difference and below the agreed floor,
the shipowner pays the bunker supplier the difference.
6.5 PHYSICALLY HEDGING BUNKER PRICES
Wet Risk Management involves contracts for physically delivered bunkers with a
Risk Management-structured price. In this case, the shipowner agrees to purchase
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specific volumes of fuel from a specific bunker supplier in the future. Price protection
for that volume of bunkers is then guaranteed through the selected price structure. Unlike
the aforementioned paper risk management structures, which derive their price protection
through cash exchanges, most wet risk management structures involve no offsetting cash
payments, because the price a shipowner pays for fuel is the protected price.
The Fixed price structure provides the shipowner with a known bunkers price for
the duration of the contract. The price he/she pays remains fixed, regardless of how
bunker prices change in the marketplace during that period and no premium payment is
required. The Extendable Fixed price offers a significant price discount (versus the
standard fixed price) in return for giving the bunker supplier the option to extend the
agreement for another term.
Lastly, the Capped price can be a very attractive form of price protection for a
shipowner who is in a highly competitive industry. This is similar to the Cap swap, as
the bunker supplier's ex wharf price to the ship owner is equal to an agreed price index
plus the 'cap premium'. Much like an insurance premium, you pay the cap premium in
return for protection against rising prices. As long as the index price is below the agreed
cap, the shipowner pays the index plus the increment; if the index exceeds the cap, he/she
pays no more than the cap price plus the increment.
6.6 HEDGING MARINE PRICE RISK
A tanker owner does not only face bunker price risk, freight rate risk is similarly
important, against which an owner may want to hedge him/herself Especially during
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depressed markets, an owner may find him/herself being in a particularly tough situation.
The good news is that, in the long term, the oil market is correlated to the bunkers
market. The bad news is that the good times tend to last shorter than the bad ones and
thus the time operating at cost or even below tends to last longer. The major factors
affecting freight rates are:
a) Seasonal variations in commodity demand and production.
b) Supply of tonnage and forward shipbuilding order book.
c) Changes in the price of bunker fuel for ships.
d) War and acts of aggression may affect the level of confidence in world economic
conditions and cause shortages of raw materials and finished products.
Disruptions in patterns of supply and demand can cause increases or decreases in
the costs of transportation.
e) Strikes and other disruptions in the supply of labour or services will affect the
volume of cargo that can be handled and produce a temporary aberration in
shipping markets.
f) Severe weather conditions can cause reduction in the supply of material and in the
amount of cargo that a ship can carry.
g) Congestion in certain load/discharging areas due to concentrated commodity
demand.
h) Changes in the cost of port expenses and in major canal transits.
i) Changes in international currency rates - the US dollar is the dominant currency
for freight and changes in its relative value to other major currencies will affect
the cost of running ships and operating them in international trades.
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Freight has been considered a service rather than a commodity for a
variety of reasons. The two most common reasons are environmental concerns,
which is a political minefield in most companies and the vetting process that
determines which ships are acceptable or unacceptable for service. The
insinuation is that no two ships are alike and thus do not meet the definition of a
commodity. Environmental concerns are obviously important, and fortunately
technology and environment directives are easing some of these concerns, but
more importantly having freight treated as a commodity will not affect its
environmental importance. In fact, it may highlight environmental issues further
as they continue to gain more visibility. The argument of vetting is overstated
since vessel particulars generally known as 'Q-88' data, regarding size, single or
double hull, age, vessel dimensions, and equipment can be classified relatively
easily into distinct categories replicating a standard commodity. [Ref. 21, 2002]
Although, dry bulk derivatives have been available since 1985 through trade in
Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange (BIFFEX) futures on the London
International Financial Futures Exchange, with settlement made against the Baltic Freight
Index (BFI), no similar exchange-traded contract is yet available for the oil tanker
market. "However, an increasing number of OTC derivatives have become available.
Among these, there is a growing market in forward freight agreements (FFAs). A FFA is
an OTC agreement between two principals which sets a freight rate for a specified
volume of cargo and vessel type on certain routes, at a date in the future. The FFA is a
paper instrument, usually negotiated through a broker." [Ref. 18, September/October
2001] The existence of viable settlement mechanisms, such as the Worldscale published
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by the Baltic Exchange, has greatly facilitated the development of FFAs. The exchange's
body of data is called the Baltic International Tanker Route Assessment (Bitra) and often
forms the basis of settlement in the freight swaps mentioned.
Turning to financial futures, ship brokers Simpson, Spence and Young
(SSY) are currently working on developing a futures contract to be cleared
through the Baltic Exchange and perhaps other futures exchanges in the future.
Both the NYMEX and IPE have studied adding freight futures to their lists of
futures products. The use of commodity futures contracts is well documented and
simply allows buyers and sellers to lock in a price in the future for a certain
commodity at a specific location. Freight futures in conjunction with swaps and
options make risk management viable in the shipping industry.
This is not a question of if but when these changes will occur. The
middlemen of the industry will continue to keep the status quo and derail any
attempt to change the current business relationships since they are the ultimate
losers of this change process. [Ref. 21, 2002]
To sum up, not only are tanker freight rates correlated to bunker prices, but they
are also dependent upon them. Thus, when bunker hedging instruments are used
effectively along with freight futures, shipping companies may reduce their risk exposure
and enhance their profits via more competitive management.
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7 BUNKERING PLANNING AND FUEL PURCHASING
7.1 BUNKERING PLANNING
The problem, a shipping company faces any time a vessel takes a voyage
including a number of bunkering ports with different prices, is how to minimise the
bunkering cost. Thus, an optimum bunkering plan needs to be found to satisfy the cost
minimisation objective.
The following simple optimisation model is frequently used to undertake the task.
Let us suppose that we have
foc: Vessel's Fuel Oil Capacity
n: nodes with corresponding for every i to n
p price,
robi remaining on board when vessel arrives at point i,
robi remaining on board when vessel depart from point i,
qi the requested fuel oil quantity and
ci the required quantity from point i-I to i.
Then the total cost is the sum of the cost of fuel oil purchased during the voyage
and subtracting the cost of fuel oil used that was purchased on previous voyages. In other
words, once a vessel consumes in whole the fuel oil, which remained on board when
commencing its voyage, it will bear the cost of the fuel oil purchased during the voyage.
Cost = p, x q,)--(pO x robo)
t=1
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Thus, the goal is to find each qi in order to minimise cost with the following
constraints.
Fori=1 ton., rob, >0
For i = O to n, robd < foc
For i =l ton., rob, = robdl - c,
An example could be:
Table 7.1: Example of Bunkering Planning.
FOC = 200 n = 4
When c =90 C2 = 90 c3 = 85 C =95
Then qo = 47.8 q, = 53 q2= 132 _q3= 53
robo=80 rob,=37.7 rob2=0.65 rob 3 =48.1 rob4 =6
Srobdo = 128 robd=90.7 robd2= 133 robd3 = 101
In paragraph 7.4, data based calculations will be performed for a VLCC, a
Suezmax, an Aframax and a Product tanker, along with fuel purchasing that will be
discussed in paragraphs 7.2 and 7.3.
7.2 FUEL PURCHASING
Density is an important parameter when purchasing a fuel, as it plays a vital role
in the handling process of a fuel. It is dependent upon the ratio of the carbon atoms that
form aromatic bonds. Density and viscosity help one to calculate the CCAI (Calculated
Carbon Aromaticity Index), which has an effect on combustion. Density is an excellent
index of the ratio of hydrogen to carbon in a fuel. In general, without doubt the smaller
the density in a fuel the better. This is illustrated in the following figure, since a fuel that
is less dense, offers more energy.
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Figure 7.1: Relationship between Density and Net Specific Energy. [Ref. 17, 1993]
7.3 FIVE PARAMETERS FOR COMPARING QUALITY
"It is particularly peculiar the fact that the people in shipping companies
purchasing fuel, rarely ask for information on the net specific energy (calorific value) of
the fuel to be purchased, from the suppliers. Usually the price per metric tonne and the
specification of the fuel is asked for." [Ref. 17, 1993]
Though, in order to create an Effective Fuel Management Programme, other
parameters should be examined at the same time.
* Density (g/ml)
" Viscosity (cSt)
" Water content % (v/v)
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" Aluminium (mg/kg)
" Net Specific Energy (MJ/kg)
For example, in a port, three suppliers offer an IFO 180 cSt, with the following
characteristics, which are the specifications of the products typically on offer.
Table 7.2: Example of quality comparison. [Ref. 17, 1993]
Product: IFO 180 cSt, 50 CQuantity: 1000 mt
Supplier Quotation Density Viscosity Water Al NSE($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) ( (MJ/kg)
A $100.00 0.985 180 0.3 10 41.00
B $95.50 0.975 170 0.8 5 40.46
C $95.50 0.988 180 0.5 15 40.10
Density/Aluminium
Concerning density, the 0.975 value is favourable, since the fuel is easily treated.
It is highly likely that supplier's B fuel is a product of the blending of straight run fuel
with a product of cracking. This is indicated by the existence of 5 ppm aluminium. As a
matter of course, the less the aluminium the better. As aforementioned [see Chapter 2],
bunkers are delivered in volume, but paid by weight. One must always check, that the
density on the Delivery Ticket, is the true density of the fuel. The tolerable international
limit is 0.005 g/ml, or $0.5 /mt and in a quantity of 1000mt, this is a difference of $500.
Viscosity
If the viscosity is greater than 200 cSt, this is unacceptable (the tolerance should
not be greater than 7.4%).
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Water Content
It is illogical to pay for water at the price of fuel, consequently, the smaller the
water content, the better.
Supplier A:
1,000mt x 0.3% = 3mt x $100/mt = $300 = $0.30/mt
Supplier B:
1,000mt x 0.8% = 8mt x $100/mt = $800 = $0.80/mt
Supplier C:
1,000mt x 0.5% = 5mt x $100/mt = $500 = $0.50/mt
There is a difference between suppliers A and B of $800 - $300 = $500 or $0.50/mt.
Net Specific Energy
DATA
Quantity : 1,000 mt
Price : Supplier A = $1 00/mt
Net Specific Energy : Supplier A = 41.00 MJ/kg
Supplier B = 40.46 MJ/kg
ENERGY MJ Supplier A: 1,000,000 kg x 41.00 MJ/kg = 41,000,000 MJ
Supplier B: 1,000,000 kg x 40.46 MJ/kg = 40,460,000 MJ
DIFFERENCE (A-B) A MJ = 540,000 MJ
COST / MJ Bunker Price: $100/mt = $100/1,00kg = $0.1/kg
$0.1/kg $0.1
= =$0.0024/MJ
41.OOMJ/kg 41.OOMJ
VALUE A MJ 540,000 MJ x $0.0024/MJ = $1,296.0
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,296.0 = $1.3/mt
1,00Omt
According to the values of density and aluminium, the offer of supplier B seems better.
The following should be taken into account though:
Supplier A
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
Supplier A is therefore
$100/mt
-$0.50
-$1.30
$98.20/mt
selected.
7.4 BUNKERING PLANNING AND FUEL PURCHASING
As stated in paragraph 7.1, the four most common tanker sizes will be considered
each for a number of voyages. After completion of a voyage, the operator of the shipping
company, who is in charge of the vessel operations, completes the 'Voyage Details'
document, on which the visited ports are filled in, as well as the loaded bunkers and those
remaining on board. Using the bunkering cost optimisation model [see paragraph 7.1],
the actual bunkering obtained from the Voyage Details, will be compared to the optimum
bunkering plan. Moreover, based on fuel purchasing analysis [see paragraphs 7.2 and
7.3], the author will examine whether further cost reduction may be achieved.
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SAVING
7.4.1 VLCC VOYAGE 1
To begin with, a VLCC tanker has a fuel oil consumption of a) 73 mt/day of IFO
380 when laden at a speed of 14 knots, b) 69 mt/day of IFO 380 when ballasted at a speed
of 15 knots and c) 3 mt/hour of IFO 380 when manoeuvring or at port
loading/discharging cargo. Furthermore, the vessel's fuel oil capacity is 5,025 mt. The
Voyage Details for a particular voyage are tabulated below.
Table 7.3: VLCC Voyage Details (7/24/01 - 9/3/01).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Bataan - 7/24/01 0200 Discharging
Singapore 7/27/01 1700 7/28/01 0600 Bunkering
Ras Isa 8/9/01 0200 8/10/01 0900 Loading
Ras Tanura 8/15/01 2300 8/17/01 1200 Loading
Fujairah 8/18/01 2000 8/19/01 1400 Bunkering
Durban 8/31/01 2100 9/3/01 1300 Discharging
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 2,317.5 124.75
RCVD AT: Singapore 495 135.5
RCVD AT: Fujairah 3,080.799 135.16
TOTAL 5,893.299
ROB COMP. VOY. 3,196
CONSUMED 2,697.299
COST $ 483,473.29
Using the bunkering cost minimisation model described in paragraph 7.1, table
7.4 is obtained. The key difference to what has previously been described is that when
calculating cost, the cost of the used bunkers received from previous voyages is not
subtracted from the current voyage's bunkering cost. This is done in order to appreciate
the cost reduction size attributed to correctly performed fuel purchasing.
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Bunkering Cost Minimisation (7/24/01 -
Ras Tanura
Ci 248.4 759 408.8 94.9 897.9
Qi 0 3,575.8
ROBi 2,069.1 1,291.2 827.6 665.8 3,314.9
ROBdi 2,317.5 2,050.2 1,236.4 760.7 4,212.8 3,196
Moving on to the fuel purchasing analysis, a few major suppliers of the two
bunkering ports of Singapore and Fujairah are to be compared based on the fuel
purchasing approach. Since a price from each individual supplier could not be obtained,
it is assumed that for each port, all suppliers sell at the same price. All information is up-
to-date with the DNV Fuel Quality Statistics, issued on the corresponding period. Thus,
for this voyage fuel quality statistics are true as of June 2001. In order to perform the
study, the values of quantity used are the ones the shipping company purchased, which
does not alter the final result in any way, as it is obtained in US dollars per metric tonne.
Table 7.5: Singapore quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 C
__Quantity: 495 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BP 135.5 0.986 356 0.3 15 40.03 3.44
EXXONMOBIL 135.5 0.982 346 0.1 1 40.11 3.67
FAMM 135.5 0.984 341 0.3 10 40.09 3.34
SHELL 135.5 0.986 353 0.0 2 40.15 3.45
Density/Aluminium
ExxonMobil offers the fuel with the lowest density and aluminium content.
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Bataan Singapore Ras Isa
COST $ 483,304.99
Table 7.4: 9/3/01).
Viscosity
All four fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
380 fuels).
Water Content
BP: 495mt x 0.3% = 1.485mt
1.485mt x $135.5/mt = $201.22 = $0.41/mt
EXXONMOBIL: 495mt x 0.1% = 0.495mt
0.495mt x $135.5/mt = $67.07 = $0.14/mt
FAMM: 495mt x 0.3% = 1.485mt
1.485mt x $135.5/mt = $201.22 = $0.41/mt
SHELL: $0.00/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the four suppliers, ExxonMobil offers a superior fuel, but not in terms of water
content and Net Specific Energy; Shell may provide a 'better value for money' fuel.
Energy MJ EXXONMOBIL: 495,000 kg x 40.11MJ/kg = 19,854,450 MJ
SHELL: 495,000 kg x 40.15MJ/kg = 19,874,250 MJ
Difference (SHELL - EXXONMOBIL) A MJ = 19,800 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $135.5/mt = $135.5/1,1OOkg = $0.14/kg
$0.14/kg $0.14
= = $0.00337 /MJ
40.15MJ/kg 40.15MJ
Value A MJ 19,800 MJ x $0.00337/MJ= $66.82
Saving $66.82 = $0.13 /mt
495mt
81
SHELL
Price: $135.5/mt
Water: 
-$0.14
Net Specific Energy: -$0.13
$135.23/mt
Shell is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from ExxonMobil at $135.23 rather than $135.5, as Shell comparatively offers this
price advantage. Or even at a lower price from BP, which offers fuel oil with the highest
water content and the lowest Net Specific Energy. Compared to Shell's fuel oil, based on
the same calculations, BP's fuel oil may be purchased at a price of $134.69.
For the port of Fujairah similar calculations are performed.
Table 7.6: Fujairah quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 0C
Quantity: 3,080.799 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (Mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
EXXON 135.16 0.967 355 0.1 3 40.51 2.97
FAMM 135.16 0.978 368 0.2 0 40.19 3.44
TEXACO 135.16 0.978 386 0.2 2 40.15 3.58
Density/Aluminium
Exxon offers the fuel with the lowest density and has low aluminium content.
Viscosity
All four fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
380 fuels).
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Water Content
EXXON: 3,080.799 x 0.1% = 3.08 1imt
3.081mt x $135.16/mt = $416.40 = $0.14/mt
FAMM: 3,080.799 x 0.2% = 6.162mt
6.162mt x $135.16/mt = $832.80 = $0.27/mt
TEXACO: 3,080.799 x 0.2% = 6.162mt
6.162mt x $135.16/mt = $832.80 = $0.27/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the four suppliers, Exxon offers a superior fuel, with the lowest water content
and highest Net Specific Energy. Let us see how Texaco's fuel, which is inferior to
Exxon's fuel, compares to the former.
Energy MJ EXXON: 3,080,799 kg x 40.5 1MJ/kg = 124,803,167.5 MJ
Difference
Cost / MJ
TEXACO: 3,080,799 kg x 40.15MJ/kg = 123,694,080 MJ
(EXXON - TEXACO) A MJ = 1,109,087.5 MJ
Bunker Price: $135.16/mt = $135.5/1,000kg = $0.14/kg
$0.14/kg 
_ $0.14 =$0.00334/MJ
40.5 1MJ/kg 40.5 1MJ
Value A MJ
Saving
1,109,087.5 MJ x $0.00334/MJ = $3,700.43
$3,700.43 
= $1.20 /mt
3,080.799mt
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EXXON
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$135.16/mt
-$0.13
-$1.20
$133.83/mt
Therefore, if fuel oil were to be purchased from Texaco, the price could be
negotiated to as low as $133.83. Returning to the bunkering cost minimisation problem,
in table 7.7 and 7.8, as shown below, the bunkering cost is found for a low fuel oil price
at Singapore only and a low fuel oil price at both Singapore and Fujairah, respectively. It
is interesting to observe that in the first case, the bunkering quantity in Singapore has
substantially increased, since the fuel oil price has fallen below that of Fujairah. The
overall bunkering cost reduction compared to the actual voyage bunkering cost is
$483,473.29 - $478,549.18 = $4,924.11. Moreover, since the vessel will not call at
Singapore for bunkering, an amount of about $5,000 is saved that would have to be paid,
otherwise.
Table 7.7: Bunkering Cost
Bataan Singapore
Minimisation
Ras Isa
(lower Singapore price).
Ras Tanura Fujairah I Durban
Ci 248.4 759 408.8 94.9 897.9
Qi 2,974.7598 601.0
ROBi 2,069.1 4,266.0 3,802.3 3,640.6 3,314.9
ROBdi 2,317.5 5,025.0 4,211.1 3,735.5 4,212.8 3,196
$ 481,906.86
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COST
Table 7.8: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Singapore and Fujairah price).
' I I I
Bataan Singapore Ras Isa Ras Tanura
Ci 248.4 759 408.8 94.9 897.9Qi 0 3,575.8 897.9
ROBi 2,069.1 1,291.2 827.6 665.8 3,314.9
ROBdi 2,317.5 2,050.2 1,236.4 760.7 4,212.8 3,196
COST $ 478,549.18
From this point onwards, the tables shown in the main body of this chapter are the
actual voyage details and the final bunkering cost minimisation table, accompanied by
the appropriate commenting. All the rest, along with the calculations, may be found in
Appendices 6, 7, 8 and 9 for the reader who wishes to study them in detail.
7.4.2 VLCC VOYAGE 2
Table 7.9: VLCC Voyage Details (3/24/01 - 5/13/01).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Ulsan - 3/24/01 0001 Discharging
Singapore 3/30/01 2100 3/31/01 1200 Bunkering
Ras Isa 4/10/01 2400 4/15/01 1000 Loading
Fujairah 4/19/01 2230 4/22/01 0400 Loading & Bunkering
Ulsan 5/9/01 1900 5/13/01 1300 Discharing
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 1,465/1,000 118/140
RCVD AT: Singapore 1,999.7 132.75
RCVD AT: Fujairah 583.572 137
TOTAL 5,048.272
85
ROB COMP. VOY. 2,060
CONSUMED 2,988.272
COST $ 345,409.54
Fujairah Durban
Table 7.10: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Singapore and Fujairah price).
Ulsan Singapore Ras Isa Fujairah Ulsan
Ci 469.2 690 292 1,241Qi _ 2,583.3 0
ROBi 1,995.8 3,859.1 3,505.1 2,199
ROBdi 2,465 4,549.1 3,797.1 3,440 2,060
COST $ 341,121.07
In this voyage lowering the fuel oil prices at Singapore and Fujairah from $132.75
to $132.05 and $137 to $136.09 [see Appendix 6] respectively, resulted in gaining a
profit of $4,288.47. In contrast to the previous voyage though, Fujairah is a loading port
and thus payment of disbursements may not be avoided, but bunkering, according to the
bunkering cost minimisation, may be avoided.
7.4.3 VLCC VOYAGE 3
Table 7.11: VLCC Voyage Details (12/8/00 - 1/14/0 1).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Durban - 12/8/00 1400 Discharging
Qeshm Island 12/19/00 0800 12/19/00 1700 Bunkering
Off Dubai 12/19/00 2200 12/20/00 2100 Bunkering
Jebel Dhanna 12/21/00 0800 12/24/00 0400 Loading
Kharg Island 12/25/00 1400 12/27/00 1900 Loading
Tabangao 1/12/01 1400 1/14/01 1600 Discharging
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 1,462/993 175.75/156.5
RCVD AT: Qeshm Isl. 1,500.04 148.5
RCVD AT: Dubai 790.09 125.5
TOTAL 4,745.13
ROB COMP. VOY. 2,441
CONSUMED 2,304.13
COST $ 321,912.24
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Cost Minimisation (lower
I I I
Durban
Qeshm
Island
Off
Dubai
Jebel
Dhanna
Kharg
Island Tabanpran
Ci 741.75 14.49 31.60 103.44 1,152.82
Qi 1,500.04 790.09
ROBi 1,713.25 3,180.80 3,923.29 3,734.50 2,526.33
ROBdi 2,455 3,195.29 3,954.89 3,837.94 3,679.15 2,441
COST $ 318,254.91
In this voyage lowering the fuel oil prices at Qeshm Island and Dubai from
$148.5 to $147.8 and $125.5 to $122.2 [see Appendix 6], respectively, resulted in gaining
a profit of $3,657.33. One may observe that during this voyage bunkering cost
minimisation is a result of negotiating for purchasing fuel oil from the suppliers at a
lower price, as bunkering quantities remained unchanged.
7.4.4 SUEZMAX VOYAGE 1
The fuel oil consumption, for the Suezmax tanker, is as follows: a) 14 knots
laden: 58 mt/day, b) 15 knots in ballast: 52 mt/day, c) discharging: 60 mt/day, d) loading:
20 mt/day, e) at anchor idle: 6 mt/day and f) at port: 6 mt/day.
Table 7.13: Suezmax Voyage Details (2/22/03 - 3/21/03).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Savona - 2/22/03 1200 Discharging
Messina 2/23/03 2100 2/23/03 2130 In Transit
Piraeus 2/25/03 0818 2/25/03 2100 Bunkering
Dardanelles 2/26/03 1000 3/1/03 1150 In Transit
Bosporus 3/1/03 2400 3/5/03 1348 In Transit
Novorossiysk 3/6/03 1918 3/10/03 0500 Loading
Bosporus 3/11/03 1018 3/13/03 1200 In Transit
Dardanelles 3/13/03 1742 3/16/03 1120 In Transit &
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Table 7.12: Bunkering Qeshm Island and Dubai price).
Bunkering
Fos 3/20/03 1012 3/21/03 2248 Discharging
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 1,192 173
RCVD AT: Piraeus 1,099.237 177
RCVD AT: Dardanelles 1,525 169
TOTAL 3,816.237
ROB COMP. VOY. 2,949.437
CONSUMED 866.8
COST $ 452,289.95
Table 7.14: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Dardanelles price).
Savona Messina Piraeus Dardanelles Bosporus
Ci 71.5 75.92 28.08 26
Qi 0 _ _
ROBi 1120.5 1044.3 1013.3 950.7
ROBdi 1192 1120.3 1041.3 976.7 938.7
Novorossiysk Bosporus Dardanelles Fos
Ci 65 72.5 14.5 232
Qi 2624.2
ROBi 873.7 740.0 713.5 3009.4
ROBdi 812.45 727.95 3241.4 2949.437
COST $ 443,496.05
During this voyage, bunkering at Piraeus had not been necessary and purchasing
fuel oil from the Dardanelles lowered the cost by $8,793.90.
7.4.5 SUEZMAX VOYAGE 2
The previous voyage of the vessel ended at Wilhelmshaven discharging blend oil
and the vessel's current voyage started at Wilhelmshaven loading straight run fuel oil.
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Table 7.15: Suezmax Voyage Details (5/21/02 - 6/14/02).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Wilhelmshaven - 5/21/02 1100 Discharging
Wilhelmshaven 5/21/02 1100 5/23/02 0130 Loading
Le Havre 5/24/02 0900 5/27/02 1500 Loading & Bunkering
Corpus Christi 6/11/02 1430 6/14/02 1800 Discharging & Bunkering
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 1,251 143
RCVD AT: Le Havre 1,498.1 151.5
RCVD AT: Corpus Christi 403.46 156
TOTAL_ 3,152.56
ROB COMP. VOY. 1,877
CONSUMED 1,275.56
COST $ 289,901.91
Table 7.16: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Le Havre and Corpus Christi price).
Wilhelmshaven Le Havre Corpus Christi
Ci 77.72 870
Qi 1,901.52 0
ROBi 1,251 1,141.28 2,072.0
ROBdi 1,219 2,942.0 1,877
$ 287,357.70
In this voyage lowering the fuel oil prices at Le Havre and Corpus Christi from
$151.50 to $151.12 and $156 to $155.08 [see Appendix 7], respectively, resulted in
gaining a profit of $2,544.21.
7.4.6 SUEZMAX VOYAGE 3
Table 7.17: Suezmax Voyage Details (5/25/01 - 6/20/01).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
LOOP - 5/25/01 1900 Discharging
Cayo Arcas 5/27/01 1300 6/1/01 2000 Loading
89
Freeport (Bahamas) 6/4/01 1000 6/4/01 1900 Bunkering
Bilbao 6/17/01 0830 6/18/01 1630 Discharging
Corunna 6/19/01 1130 6/20/01 1900 Discharging
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 764 127
RCVD AT: Freeport 799 125.45
RCVD AT: Corunna 600.4 128.5
TOTAL 2,163.4
ROB COMP. VOY. 963
CONSUMED 1,200.4
COST $ 177,385.95
Table 7.18: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Corunna
LOOP Cayo Arcas Freeport Bilbao Corunna
Ci 93.6 145 732.25 46.4
Qi 1,399.4 0.0
ROBi 670.4 427.2 1,092.1 1,033.1
ROBdi 764 572.2 1,824 1,079.5 963
COST $ 175,554.73
Even though the fuel oil price at Corunna was lowered from $128.5 to $127.83
[see Appendix 7], the bunkering cost minimisation suggested that bunkering could have
been avoided at Corunna, thus making a profit of $1,831.22 by bunkering at Freeport.
7.4.7 AFRAMAX VOYAGE 1
The fuel oil consumption, for the Aframax tanker, is as follows: a) 14 knots laden:
43 mt/day, b) 15 knots in ballast: 38 mt/day, c) discharging: 60 mt/day, d) loading: 18
mt/day, e) at anchor idle: 6 mt/day and f) at port: 6 mt/day. It should be noted that the
vessel considered burns lower viscosity fuel oil, the IFO 180 class and thus bunkering is
more expensive by about $2 - $10/mt. This does not have a direct effect on the research,
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as the author explores what the cost savings are and not the cost in total. Moreover, the
reader should not be surprised by higher NSE values, as lower density fuel offers higher a
NSE [see Figure 7.1]. In general, lower viscosity fuels are less dense than higher
viscosity fuels.
Table 7.19: Aframax Voyage Details (2/20/03 - 3/30/03).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Lawe-Lawe - 2/20/03 0230 Discharging
Singapore 2/24/03 0530 2/24/03 2030 Bunkering
Suez 3/11/03 2100 3/12/03 2030 In Transit
Dardanelles 3/14/03 2400 3/20/03 1100 In Transit
Bosporus 3/20/03 2130 3/21/03 0800 In Transit
Odessa 3/22/03 1100 3/27/03 1000 Loading
Bourgas 3/28/03 0900 3/30/03 1900 Discharging
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 831.7 178.5
RCVD AT: Singapore 1,004.5 209
RCVD AT: Suez 1,200.067 177
TOTAL 3,036.267
ROB COMP. VOY. 1,500
CONSUMED 1,536.267
COST $ 422,352.36
Table 7.20: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Singapore and Suez price).
' 1 1Lawe-Lawe Singapore I Suez Dardanelles Bosporus Odessa
Ci 208 936 104 20.8 52 58
Qi 316.05 1,888.517
ROBi 623.7 0.0 1,749.5 1,693.7 1,624.2 1,512
ROBdi 831.7 936.0 1,853.5 1,714.5 1,676.2 1,570.217 1,500
$ 399,969.31
During this voyage much of the cost savings were a result of the bunkering cost
minimisation, as fuel oil is purchased to suffice the voyage to Suez. A prudent operator
though would not compromise the redundant operation of the vessel for any cost savings
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Bourgas
and thus would stock up as much fuel oil as believed to be needed. Nonetheless, the cost
savings for this voyage are $22,383.05.
7.4.8 AFRAMAX VOYAGE 2
Table 7.21: Aframax Voyage Details (11/25/02 - 1/22/03).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Texas City - 11/25/02 2300 Discharging
Southwest Pass 11/26/02 2300 11/26/02 2320 In Transit
Convent 11/27/02 1830 11/29/02 0930 Loading
Norco 11/29/02 0930 12/1/02 1600 Loading
St. Eustatius 12/8/02 1130 12/9/02 1300 Loading
Singapore 1/18/03 1100 1/22/03 0300 Discharging
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 464.83/700/609.97 149/143/150.33
RCVD AT: St. Eustatius 1,349.783 154.7
RCVD AT: Singapore 2,189.736 178.5
TOTAL 5,314.319
ROB COMP. VOY. 2,266.4
CONSUMED 3,047.919
COST $ 599,679.31
Table 7.22: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower St. Eustatius and Singapore price).
Texas City
Southwest
Pass Convent Norco
St.
Eustatius Singapore
Ci 52 39 0 394.4 2,320
Qi 2,432.3752 1,107.1438
ROBi 1,722.8 1,663.8 1,614.8 1,160.2 1,233.0
ROBdi 1,774.8 1,702.8 1,614.8 1,554.6 3,553.0 2,266.4
COST $ 573,813.97
Similarly to the previous voyage, during this voyage much of the cost savings
were a result of the bunkering cost minimisation, as fuel oil is purchased in abundance
from St. Eustatius at a lower price than Singapore. This, of course, can be done up to the
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fuel oil capacity that the vessel's fuel oil tanks offer and the remaining fuel is purchased
at Singapore. Nevertheless, the cost savings for this voyage are $25,865.34.
7.4.9 AFRAMAX VOYAGE 3
Table 7.23: Aframax Voyage Details (12/4/00 - 1/10/0 1).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Lavera - 12/4/00 1730 Discharging
Skikda 12/5/00 1945 12/16/00 0600 Loading
Algeciras 12/18/00 0830 12/19/00 0600 Bunkerin
New York 1/4/01 1900 1/10/01 0730 Discharging &
Buinkeirmgc
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 104.8/550 171.5/174
RCVD AT: Algeciras 1,500 168
RCVD AT: New York 1,209.13 173.9
TOTAL 3,363.93
ROB COMP. VOY. 1,290
CONSUMED 2,073.93
COST $ 462,267.71
Table 7.24: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Algeciras and New York price).
Lavera 1 
1
Skikda Algeciras New York
Ci 60.5 128.1 1,006.5
Qi ' 2,709.13 0
ROBi 594.3 96.3 1,706.5
ROBdi 654.8 224.4 2,713.0 1,290
COST $ 450,528.32
Despite the reduction in price at New York, all of the fuel oil required is
purchased from Algeciras, leading to a cost reduction of $11,739.39.
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7.4.10 PRODUCT VOYAGE 1
The fuel oil consumption, for the Product tanker, is as follows: a) 14 knots laden:
31 mt/day, b) 14 knots in ballast: 28 mt/day, c) discharging: 8 mt/day, d) loading: 5
mt/day, e) at anchor idle: 5 mt/day and f) at port: 5 mt/day.
Table 7.25: Product Voyage Details (12/8/02 - 1/3/03).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
Conakry - 12/8/02 0830 Discharging
Algeciras 12/14/02 0530 12/14/02 1500 Bunkering
Suez 12/19/02 2300 12/20/02 2200 In Transit
Yanbu 12/22/02 0730 12/23/02 1330 Loading
Suez 12/24/02 2230 12/25/02 1830 In Transit
Algeciras 12/31/02 2000 1/3/03 0200 Discharging &
Bunkering
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 250/150 131/125
RCVD AT: Algeciras 750 131
RCVD AT: Algeciras 508 144
TOTAL 1,658
ROB COMP. VOY. 987
CONSUMED 671
COST $ 171,402.00
Table 7.26: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Algeciras price).
- ' ' 1Conakrv Algeciras Suez Yanbu Sn ez
Ci 168 148.4 39.2 42.625 190.65
Qi 970.25 287.75
ROBi 232 1,051.6 986.0 933.8 719.8
ROBdi 400 1,200.0 1,025.2 976.4 910.5 987
UOST I $ 167,922.33
94
Algeciras
In this voyage, optimising the bunkering planning and lowering the fuel oil prices
at Algeciras from $131 to $130.51 and $144 to $143.51 [see Appendix 9], resulted in
gaining a profit of $3,479.67.
7.4.11 PRODUCT VOYAGE 2
Table 7.27: Product Voyage Details (3/18/01 - 5/2/01).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
San Fransisco - 3/18/01 2200 Discharging
San Fransisco 3/18/01 2200 3/19/01 0900 -
Ulsan 4/8/01 0500 4/10/01 0030 Loading &Bunkering
Lo Agees4/30/01 0900 5/2/01 2330 Discharing
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 408/505 124/152
RCVD AT: Ulsan 500 152.5
RCVD AT: Los Angeles 301 189
TOTAL 1,714
ROB COMP. VOY. 694
CONSUMED 1,020
COST $ 133,139.00
Table 7.28: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Ulsan and Los Angeles price).
San
Fransisco Ulsan Los Angeles
Ci 458.85 529.7
Qi 757.35 43.70
ROBi 913 451.65 670.3
ROBdi 910.5 1,200.0 694
$ 122,973.49I COST
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In this voyage, optimising the bunkering planning and lowering the fuel oil prices
at Ulsan and Los Angeles from $152.5 to $151.6 and $189 to $186.71 [see Appendix 9],
respectively, resulted in saving $10,165.51.
7.4.12 PRODUCT VOYAGE 3
Table 7.29: Product Voyage Details (12/22/00 - 2/7/01).
PORT OF ARRIVED SAILED REASON
San Juan (Puerto Rico - 12/22/00 0850 Discharging
San Juan (Puerto Rico) 12/22/00 0850 12/23/00 1300 Bunkering
Bonny 1/7/01 2200 1/15/01 0900 Loading
Houston 2/5/01 0606 2/7/01 2348 Discharging &Houston Bunkei
BUNKERS MT USD
ROB COM. VOY. 207/500 171/153
RCVD AT: San Juan 399 174
RCVD AT: Houston 1,000 124
TOTAL 2,106
ROB COMP. VOY. 1,163
CONSUMED 943
COST $ 193,426.00
Table 7.30: Bunkering Cost Minimisation (lower Houston price).
San Juan Bonny Houston
Ci 326.2 546
213.7 1,185
ROBi 707 583.5 0.0
ROBdi 909.7 546.0 1,163
COST $ 183,389.10
In this voyage, optimising the bunkering planning and lowering the fuel oil prices
at Houston from $124 to $123.38 [see Appendix 9], resulted in saving $10,036.9.
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8 CONCLUSIONS
As discussed, marine fuel oil is a product of the refining process that is not
profitable to produce for the oil refineries in large quantities, specifically from the 70's
onwards. Its deteriorating quality through the years has created a headache to those
involved in the shipping industry.
It is of vital importance for any seagoing engineer or mariner to be able to avoid
the potentially catastrophic losses arising from loading marine fuel oils of unsuitable
quality or insufficient quantity. Ship's officers, operators and managers must understand
the pitfalls of the bunkering process and the steps which should be undertaken in the
event of a dispute arising and be aware of the fuel purchasing management concept.
Regulations on the air pollution from ships in the EU will place an additional
burden on those involved in the industry. These regulations have not been ratified yet,
and both IMO and the EU should examine the situation in a delicate manner. The
benefits in the form of reduced emissions from a reduced content of sulphur in bunker
fuels should be estimated. The economic benefits of the reduced emissions should also
be estimated. Other possible methods to reduce ship emissions, such as obligatory
connection to an electrical grid during port visits should be evaluated.
Most importantly, the option of emissions trading, as the International Bunker
Industry Association (IBIA) suggests, may be an alternative solution to the approach of
consuming low-sulphur fuel oil. "The emissions trading scheme incorporated into the US
Clean Air Act amendment which came into force in 1990 was the precursor to the idea of
flexible mechanisms within the Kyoto Protocol." [Ref. 11, 2003] Under the trading
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scheme, in the land based industry of generating electricity, each country pays in advance
in order to release to the air a specific amount of emissions for each calendar year.
During the course of each year, countries may trade purchased emissions rights among
themselves. At the year ending, those with emissions above their bought quota pay the
equivalent amount of money. It would be of interest to determine the benefit of such a
solution for the shipping industry. Of course, vessels with trading patterns within Europe
will have to be favoured to others. "Perhaps the lack of knowledge on the subject of
emissions trading has resulted in little consideration until recently of using the
mechanism to achieve SO, emissions reductions for shipping. There is history of
evidence indicating that where there is a demand for a solution, that demand stimulates
the creation for solutions. And there is no doubt that an efficient market has proved over
time to be the most effective way we know of discovering price. Emissions trading
enables these two ingredients to come together in what will undoubtedly result in
achievement of substantially lower emissions, at appreciably lower cost than a regulated
option." [Ref 11, 2003] Ratification of Annex VI and of any imposed EU legislation,
under the sulphur reduction option, would result in the entire freight rate being utilised by
the running costs. Thus, ratification of Annex VI should be accompanied by an
approximate increase of 20% in the daily freight rates, so that as before ratification
shipping companies could cover their management fees, investment cost and have a
required return on investment.
One may ask whether the overall cost increase in freight rates, will reduce the
amount of cargo or ton-miles shipped. As discussed, the major importers of oil are Japan,
Europe and the USA. Europe, within which emissions regulations will apply for certain,
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'consumes' fuel oil that mainly comes from the North Sea offshore oil production
platforms and Russia. In order to observe such a reduction in ton-miles shipped, a
feasible solution might be to construct an integrated system of pipelines that will carry oil
from one country to another. An increase in freight rates has to outweigh the risk (i.e.
explosion, terrorist attack, etc.) of having such a system passing through European
countries for this solution to stand. Japan, an island by itself, relies heavily on foreign
imports and will most probably not be able to restrain an increase in freight rates. Lastly,
the US from the 70s oil crisis and onwards is experiencing a growth in oil demand while
its own production cannot entirely supply this growing demand. Besides, in three of the
five routes studied the US is an importer of oil and thus oil consumption is dependent on
these foreign imports.
As far as risk management is concerned, for a shipping company managing a fleet
of tankers it is difficult to implement a successful bunker price management strategy. A
liner company would be more profitable in doing so, since the ports within which its
vessels operate are known.
It should be remembered that all freight departments are judged on how they
charter shipping versus the spot market, which is usually two weeks out in the future. By
definition, this almost insures that they will be judged favourably. The real question to
be asked is 'What did they do when the risk was taken?' For example, if a trader wins a
spot tender 90 days in the future using a freight department estimate of Worldscale 150
for the bid, but by the time the cargo loads, it has jumped to Worldscale 300, then the
trader is probably going to lose much money for the company. However, the freight
department will be judged on how they did their chartering in the spot market (i.e. at
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Worldscale 300). Management will be happy with the freight department and critical of
the trading department when in fact the freight department allowed the market price to
double without any proactive risk management activity.
Market makers will enter into the freight market, and have similar impact as Wall
Street had on the oil markets in the 1980s. They will capture inefficiencies of the bid
versus ask. Moreover, instead of a shipowner having to enter into a timecharter
agreement when markets are low, he/she may hedge against high bunker prices and low
freight rates using the risk management tools discussed. In so doing, he/she will avoid
worrying about the quality of fuel oil purchased by the charterers. Of course, most
shipowners add a clause in the Timecharter Party Agreement stating the minimum quality
characteristics fuel oil should have. Still, one bunkering is enough to destroy a marine
engine in service
Concerning the bunkering planning and fuel oil purchasing optimisation, taking
into account that a vessel will make about ten to fifteen voyages per year, an operator
may save: a) $40,000-$65,000 for a VLCC, b) $45,000-$65,000 for a Suezmax, c)
$200,000 - $300,000 for an Aframax and d) $70,000 - $120,000 for a Product tanker per
year. However, it needs to be emphasized that there are practical constraints and
implications of such a means of reducing voyage cost.
In relation to the bunkering planning minimisation algorithm, an operator should
be reluctant merely storing in a vessel's fuel oil tanks the required fuel oil quantity that a
vessel will consume until the next bunkering port [see Paragraph 7.4.7]. To avoid
compromising the vessel's redundancy, additional fuel oil should be purchased.
Moreover, there may be either a limiting quantity, due to tight availability, or a minimum
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quantity to be purchased in a port, thus restraining either in the upside or in the downside
the quantity of fuel oil purchased. Additionally, although worldwide bunker prices move
together in the long run, there are short term deviations between prices. Whatever the
case, an operator in view of increasing/decreasing bunker prices will decide to either
stock up fuel oil or to wait prices to drop, so as to avoid bunkering at a higher cost. In
other cases, an operator may be bound by the Tanker Voyage Charter Party agreement
not to bunker while loaded or while in ballast a vessel may not be given enough time to
bunker at a desired port. On the other hand, a shipowner may add a bunker deviation
clause in the Charter Party agreement allowing him a small and customary deviation in
the trade. This may not usually be unlawful, but the scope of what is 'customary' has
always been very narrowly interpreted at law. One such clause is the P&I Bunker
Deviation Clause, 1948 which reads:
'The vessel in addition to all other liberties shall have liberty as part of the contract
voyage and at any stage thereof to proceed to any port or ports whatsoever whether such
ports are on or off the direct and/or customary route or routes to the ports of loading or
discharge named in this charter and there take oil bunkers in any quantity in the
discretion of owners even to the full capacity of fuel tanks, deep tanks, and any other
compartment in which oil can be carried whether such amount is or is not required for the
chartered voyage.'
Regarding fuel oil purchasing, it needs to be noted that due to lack of information,
the necessary calculations were carried out assuming all suppliers, within a port, offering
fuel oil at the same price. This may be seen as a naive assumption to make, but
nevertheless when buying fuel oil, one should evaluate the different prices on offer and
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exploit, based on water content and NSE, any arbitrage opportunities that may appear. In
addition, one should bear in mind that the research herein uses historical data to evaluate
the cost savings presented. Both in terms of the fuel prices and the fuel quality statistics,
the data used were true at the time of the voyage. The former are settled daily and the
latter are issued on a quarterly basis. Thus, an operator may not know the price of the
fuel on the bunkering date until it is purchased and the fuel quality statistics until the
quarter ends. By and large, when considering minimising the bunkering cost, an operator
may only assume a price for the fuel to be purchased and when negotiating this price with
the fuel suppliers based on the water content and NSE, he/she will do so according to past
data. Finally, regarding fuel oil purchasing, an operator should ensure the purchased fuel
oil does not compromise the engine's performance. In this respect, bunker alerts are
issued by the DNV Petroleum Services to warn operators of any off-spec fuel.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1
INVITATION FOR SAMPLING
Request from master to charterers' port agents and bunker supplier to attend during
representative sampling.
FROM:
COMPANY:
TO: DATE:
TIME:
AT:
RE: MV
Samples of bunkers
Dear Sirs,
[In accordance with charterparty conditions] I hereby request you to ensure that
representative samples of the bunkers to be supplied to the ship will be taken and sealed
in the presence of competent and authorised representatives of charterers and the ship,
such samples to be taken during bunkering at the ship's manifold. The ship will require
two samples.
It will be of assistance to you to know that the ship has facility for drawing
continuous samples at the manifold. If no joint samples are taken during bunkering by a
satisfactory alternative system, only those samples drawn at the manifold by the ship's
representatives will be regarded as representative samples.
I shall be grateful if you will advise me as soon as possible what arrangements
have been made by you or the bunker supplier in respect of bunkering and sampling.
Yours faithfully
Master
Ship's authorised personnel:
Make and model of sampling equipment:
Make and model of main engine:
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Appendix 2
LETTER OF PROTEST
Protest by master for failure of charterers' port agents or bunker supplier to attend during
representative sampling.
FROM:
COMPANY:
TO: DATE:
TIME:
AT:
RE: MV
Samples of bunkers
Dear Sirs,
I hereby make a formal protest that you and the bunker supplier have failed to
participate in the proper obtaining and sealing during bunkering time of representative
samples of the bunkers supplied to the ship.
In particular:
[ No samples have been drawn by you and supplied.[] Ready sealed samples have been supplied.[ Samples were drawn in a method which is unsatisfactory and susceptible to
gross error.
I hereby give you notice that the vessel has taken her own samples during the
bunkering operation [which were sealed in the presence of charterers or bunker supplier's
representative] [in the absence of a response to my invitation to attend joint sampling]
and only these samples will be regarded as representative. Two sealed samples drawn by
the ship are available to you on request.
Yours faithfully
Master
Make and model of sampling equipment:
Make and model of main engine:
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Appendix 3
LETTER OF PROTEST
Protest by master in the event of a bunker quantity dispute arising.
FROM:
COMPANY:
TO: DATE:
TIME:
AT:
RE: MV
Dear Sirs,
I hereby do lodge protest in respect of *
I must therefore - on behalf of my owners - hold you fully responsible for all
consequences, losses, claims and or costs incurred thereby.
Further on behalf of my owners and or any other party concerned, I reserve their
rights to refer to this matter at a future date.
Yours faithfully
Master
Chief Engineer:
Acknowledged:
NOTE: * Here insert details of the event/matter and reasons for which you submit the
protest.
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Appendix 4
LETTER OF PROTEST
Notification by master to charterers' port agents and bunker supplier that fuel does not
conform with specifications required by the vessel.
FROM:
COMPANY:
TO: DATE:
TIME:
AT:
RE: MV
Bunkers loaded at
Dear Sirs,
I hereby give you notice that an analysis carried out on this ship of a
representative sample of the bunkers supplied by you indicates the deficiencies listed
below. The fuel is therefore outside the specification of fuel suitable to the ship's engines
and auxiliary machinery and has been submitted for further analysis.
Deficiencies were noted in:
1. Density [1
2. Viscosity []
3. Pour point [ ]
4. Water content []
5. Salt Water []
6. Compatibility []
7. Catalytic fines []
Owners await charterers' instructions and until these are received, the ship cannot
proceed. In the meantime, the ship's engineering staff will use their best endeavours to
protect the ship's engines (including the slowing and stopping of the ship's machinery
when necessary). Owners hold charterers fully responsible for any damage, delays, poor
performance, over-consumption or any other loss or expense arising as a direct or indirect
consequence of your failure to supply suitable fuel.
Yours faithfully
Master
Make and model of sampling equipment:
Make and model of main engine:
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Appendix 5
ANNEX VI OF MARPOL 73/78
REGULATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF AIR POLLUTION FROM SHIPS
REGULATION 14: SULPHUR OXIDES, SO.
General Requirements
1) The sulphur content of any fuel oil used on board ships shall not exceed 4.5%
m/m.
2) The worldwide average sulphur content of residual fuel oil supplied for use on
board ships shall be monitored taking into account guidelines to be developed by
the Organization.
Requirements within SOx Emission Control Areas
3) For the purpose of this regulation, SOx emission control areas shall include:
a) the Baltic Sea area as defined in regulation 10(l)(b) of Annex I; and
b) any other sea area, including port areas, designated by the Organization in
accordance with criteria and procedures for designation of SOx emission
control areas with respect to the prevention of air pollution from ships
contained in appendix III to this Annex.
4) While, ships are within SOx emission control areas, at least one of the following
conditions shall be fulfilled:
a) the sulphur content of fuel oil used on board ships in a SOx emission
control area does not exceed 1.5% m/m;
b) an exhaust gas cleaning system, approved by the Administration taking
into account guidelines to be developed by the Organization, is applied to
reduce the total emission of sulphur oxides from ships, including both
auxiliary and main propulsion engines, to 6.0 g SOx/kWh or less
calculated as the total weight of sulphur dioxide emission. Waste streams
from the use of such equipment shall not be discharged into enclosed
ports, harbours and estuaries unless it can be thoroughly documented by
the ship that such waste streams have no adverse impact on the ecosystems
of such enclosed ports, harbours and estuaries, based upon criteria
communicated by the authorities of the port State to the Organization.
The Organization shall circulate; the criteria to all parties to the
Convention; or
c) any other technological method that is verifiable and enforceable to limit
SOx emissions to a level equivalent to that described in sub-paragraph (b)
is applied. These methods shall be approved by the Administration taking
into account guidelines to be developed by the Organization.
5) The sulphur content of fuel oil referred to in paragraph (1) and paragraph (4)(a) of
this regulation shall be documented by the supplier as required by regulation 18 of
this Annex.
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6) Those ships using separate fuel oils to comply with paragraph (4)(a) of this
regulation shall allow sufficient time for the fuel oil service system to be fully
flushed of all fuels exceeding 1.5% m/m sulphur content prior to entry into a SOx
emission control area. The volume of low sulphur fuel oils (less than or equal to
1.5% sulphur content) in each tank as well as the date, time, and position of the
ship when any fuel-changeover operation is completed, shall be recorded in such
log-book as prescribed by the Administration.
7) During the first 12 months immediately following entry into force of the present
Protocol, or of an amendment to the present Protocol designating a specific SOx
emission control area under paragraph (3)(b) of this regulation, ships entering a
SOx emission control area referred to in paragraph (3)(a) of this regulation or
designated under paragraph (3)(b) of this regulation are exempted from the
requirements in paragraphs (4) and (6) of this regulation and from the
requirements of paragraph (5) of this regulation insofar as they relate to paragraph
(4)(a) of this regulation.
REGULATION 18: FUEL OIL QUALITY
1) Fuel oil for combustion purposes delivered to and used on board ships to which this
Annex applies shall meet the following requirements:
a) except as provided in sub-paragraph (b):
i) the fuel oil shall be blends of hydrocarbons derived from petroleum
refining. This shall not preclude the incorporation of small amounts of
additives intended to improve some aspects of performance;
ii) the fuel oil shall be free from inorganic acid;
iii) the fuel oil shall not include any added substance or chemical waste which
either:
(1) jeopardizes the safety of ships or adversely affects the performance of
2)
3)
the machinery, or
(2) is harmful to personnel, or
(3) contributes overall to additional air pollution; and
b) fuel oil for combustion purposes derived by methods other than petroleum
refining shall not:
i) exceed the sulphur content set forth in regulation 14 of this Annex;
ii) cause an engine to exceed the NOx emission limits set forth in regulation
13(3)(a) of this Annex;
iii) contain inorganic acid; and
iv) (1) jeopardize the safety of ships or adversely affect the performance of
the machinery, or
(2) be harmful to personnel, or
(3) contribute overall to additional air pollution.
This regulation does not apply to coal in its solid form or nuclear fuels.
For each ship subject to regulations 5 and 6 of this Annex, details of fuel oil for
combustion purposes delivered to and used on board shall be recorded by means of a
bunker delivery note which shall contain at least the information specified in
appendix V to this Annex.
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4) The bunker delivery note shall be kept on board the ship in such a place as to be
readily available for inspection at all reasonable times. It shall be retained for a
period of three years after the fuel oil has been delivered on board.
5) a) The competent authority of the Government of a Party to the Protocol of 1997 may
inspect the bunker delivery notes on board any ship to which this Annex applies while
the ship is in its port or offshore terminal, may make a copy of each delivery note,
and may require the master or person in charge of the ship to certify that each copy is
a true copy of such bunker delivery note. The competent authority may also verify
the contents of each note through consultations with the port where the note was
issued.
b) The inspection of the bunker delivery notes and the taking of certified copies by
the competent authority under this paragraph shall be performed as expeditiously as
possible without causing the ship to be unduly delayed.
6) The bunker delivery note shall be accompanied by a representative sample of the fuel
oil delivered taking into account guidelines to be developed by the Organization. The
sample is to be sealed and signed by the supplier's representative and the master or
officer in charge of the bunker operation on completion of bunkering operations and
retained under the ship's control until the fuel oil is substantially consumed, but in
any case for a period of not less than 12 months from the time of delivery.
7) Parties to the Protocol of 1997 undertake to ensure that appropriate authorities
designated by them:
a) maintain a register of local suppliers of fuel oil;
b) require local suppliers to provide the bunker delivery note and sample as required
by this regulation, certified by the fuel oil supplier that the fuel oil meets the
requirements of regulations 14 and 18 of this Annex;
c) require local suppliers to retain a copy of the bunker delivery note for at least
three years for inspection and verification by the port State as necessary;
d) take action as appropriate against fuel oil suppliers that have been found to deliver
fuel oil that does not comply with that stated on the bunker delivery note;
e) inform the Administration of any ship receiving fuel oil found to be noncompliant
with the requirements of regulations 14 and 18 of this Annex; and
f) inform the Organization for transmission to Parties to the Protocol of 1997 of all
cases where fuel oil suppliers have failed to meet the requirements specified in
regulations 14 or 18 of this Annex.
8) In connection with port State inspections carried out by Parties to the Protocol of
1997, the Parties further undertake to:
a) inform the Party or non-Party under whose jurisdiction bunker delivery note was
issued of cases of delivery of noncompliant fuel oil, giving all relevant
information; and
b) ensure that remedial action as appropriate is taken to bring noncompliant fuel oil
discovered into compliance.
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Appendix 6
VLCC VOYAGE #2
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (3/24/01 - 5/13/01).
Ulsan Singapore Ras Isa Fuiairah
Ci 469.2 690 292 1,241
Qi_ 2,583.3 0
ROBi 1,995.8 3,859.1 3,505.1 2,199
ROBdi 2,465 4,549.1 3,797.1 3,440 2,060
COST $ 342,929.36
Singapore quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 0C
Quantity: 1,999.7 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BP 132.75 0.985 346 0.2 14 40.03 3.60
EXXONMOBIL 132.75 0.980 344 0.1 3 40.12 3.70
FAMM 132.75 0.984 344 0.3 13 40.02 3.51
SHELL 132.75 0.982 327 0.1 2 40.17 3.52
Density/Aluminium
ExxonMobil offers the fuel with the lowest density and low
Viscosity
alu
All four fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance
380 fuels).
minium content.
of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
Water Content
BP: 1,999.7mt x 0.2% = 3.999mt
3.999mt x $132.75/mt = $530.92 = $0.27/mt
EXXONMOBIL: 1999.7mt x 0.1%= 1.9997mt
1,9997mt x $132.75/mt = $265.46 = $0.13/mt
FAMM: 1999.7mt x 0.3% = 5.999mt
5.999mt x $132.75/mt = $796.38 = $0.40/mt
SHELL: 1,999.7mt x 0.1% = 1.9997mt
1.9997mt x $132.75/mt = $265.46 = $0.13/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the four suppliers, ExxonMobil offers a superior fuel, but not in terms of the
Net Specific Energy; Shell may provide a 'better value for money' fuel.
Energy MJ EXXONMOBIL: 1,999,700 kg x 40.12MJ/kg = 80,227,964 MJ
SHELL: 1,999,700 kg x 40.17MJ/kg = 80,327,949 MJ
Difference (SHELL - EXXONMOBIL) A MJ = 99,985 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $132.75/mt = $132.75/1,000kg = $0.13/kg
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Ulsan
Value A MJ
Saving
SHELL
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$0.13 /kg $0.13 $0.00330/MJ
40.17MJ/kg 40.17MJ
99,985 MJ x $0.00330/MJ= $330.42
$330.42 = $0.17 /mt
1,999.7mt
$132.75/mt
$0.00
-$0.17
$132.58/mt
Shell is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from ExxonMobil at $132.58 rather than $132.75, as Shell comparatively offers this
price advantage. Or even at a lower price from Famm, which offers fuel oil with the
highest water content and the lowest Net Specific Energy. Compared to Shell's fuel oil,
based on the same calculations, Famm's fuel oil may be purchased at a price of $132.05.
For the port of Fujairah similar calculations are performed.
Fujairah quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Quantity: 583.572 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
E O ($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (gg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
EXXON 137 0.967 355 0.1 3 40.51 2.97
FAMM 137 0.974 370 0.1 1 40.27 3.44
TEXACO 137 0.980 352 0.2 4 40.35 2.79
Density/Aluminium
Exxon offers the fuel with the lowest density and has low aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408
380 fuels).
Water Content
EXXON: 583.572 x 0.1% = 0.584mt
0.584mt x $137/mt $79.95 = $0.14/mt
FAMM: 583.572 x 0.1% = 0.584mt
0.584mt x $137/mt = $79.95 = $0.14/mt
TEXACO: 583.572 x 0.2%= 1.167mt
1.167mt x $137/mt = $159.90 = $0.27/mt
cSt for IFO
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Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 0C
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Exxon offers a superior fuel, with the lowest water content
and highest Net Specific Energy. Let us see how this compares to Famm's fuel that is
inferior.
Energy MJ
Difference
Cost / MJ
Value A MJ
Saving
EXXON: 583,572 kg x 40.51MJ/kg = 23,640,501.72 MJ
FAMM: 583,572 kg x 40.27MJ/kg = 23,500,444.44 MJ
(EXXON - FAMM) A MJ= 140,057.28 MJ
Bunker Price: $137/mt = $137/1 ,00kg = $0.14/kg
$0.14/kg $0.14 = $0.00338/MJ
40.51MJ/kg 40.51MJ
140,057.28 MJ x $0.00338/MJ = $473.66
$473.66 = $0.81/mt
583.572mt
EXXON
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$137/mt
-$0.10
-$0.81
$136.09/mt
Therefore, if fuel oil were to be purchased from Famm, the price could be
negotiated to as low as $136.09.
VLCC VOYAGE #3
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (3/24/01 - 5/13/01).
Durban
Qeshm
Island
Off
Dubai
Jebel
Dihanna
Kharg
Island
___Cj_ 741.75 14.49 31.60 103.44 1,152.82
Qj 1,500.04 790.09 _
ROBj 1,713.25 3,180.80 3,103.20 2,914.41 2,496.33
ROBdj 2,455 3,195.29 3,134.80 3,017.85 3,649.15 2,441
COST $ 321,912.24
Qeshm Island quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 C
Quantity: 1,500.04 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
GLOBAL 148.5 0.969 378 0.0 0 40.52 3.03
GLOBAL
ENERGY 148.5 0.972 382 0.1 3 40.37 3.17
112
Taban ao
Density/Aluminium
Global offers the fuel with lower density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
Both fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO 380
fuels).
Water Content
GLOBAL: $0.00/mt
GLOBAL ENERGY: 1,500.04mt x 0.1%= 1.50004mt
1.50004mt x $148.5/mt = $222.76 = $0.15/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the two suppliers, Global offers a superior fuel to Global Energy's. Let us see,
how much one can save in total.
Energy MJ GLOBAL: 1,500,040 kg x 40.52MJ/kg = 60,781,621 MJ
GLOBAL ENERGY: 1,500,040 kg x 40.37MJ/kg = 60,556,615 MJ
Difference (GLOBAL - GLOBAL ENERGY) A MJ= 225,006 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $148.5/mt = $148.5/1,000kg = $0.15/kg
$0.15/kg 
_ $0.15 = $0.00366/MJ
40.52MJ / kg 40.52MJ
Value A MJ 225,006 MJ x $0.00366/MJ = $824.61
Saving $824.61 = $0.55 /mt
1,500.04mt
GLOBAL
Price: $148.5/mt
Water: -$0.15
Net Specific Energy: -$0.55
$147.8/mt
Global is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Global Energy at $147.8 rather than $148.5, as Global comparatively offers this
price advantage.
For the port of Dubai similar calculations are performed.
Dubai quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 "C
Quantity: 790.09 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
ADNOC 125.5 0.946 347 0.1 0 41.16 1.87
FAL 125.5 0.979 362 0.3 5 40.16 3.34
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Density/Aluminium
Adnoc offers the fuel with lower density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
Both fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO 380
fuels).
Water Content
ADNOC: 790.09mt x 0.1% = 0.79009mt
0.79009mt x $125.5/mt = $99.16 = $0.13/mt
FAL: 790.09mt x 0.3% = 2.37027mt
2.37027mt x $125.5/mt = $297.47 = $0.38/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the two suppliers, Adnoc offers a superior fuel to Fal's. Let us see, how much
one can save in total.
Energy MJ
Difference
ADNOC: 790,090 kg x 41.16MJ/kg = 32,520,104 MJ
FAL: 790,090 kg x 40.16MJ/kg = 31,730,014 MJ
(ADNOC - FAL) A MJ = 790,090 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $125.5/mt = $125.5/1,00kg = $0.13/kg
$0.13/kg
41.16MJ/kg
$0.13 =$0.00305/MJ
41.16MJ
Value A MJ 790,090 MJ x $0.00305/MJ = $2,409.05
$2,409.05 = $3.05/mt
790.09mt
Saving
ADNOC
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$125.5/mt
-$0.25
-$3.05
$122.2/mt
Adnoc is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Fal at $122.2 rather than $125.5, as Adnoc comparatively offers this price
advantage.
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Appendix 7
SUEZMAX VOYAGE #1
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (2/22/03 - 3/21/03).
Savona Messina Piraeus Dardanelles Bosporus
Ci 71.5 75.92 28.08 26
Qi 0
ROBi 1,120.5 1,044.3 1,013.3 950.7
ROBdi 1,192 1,120.3 1,041.3 976.7 938.7
Novorossiysk Bosporus Dardanelles Fos
Ci 65 72.5 14.5 232
Qi 2,624.2
ROBi 873.7 740.0 713.5 3,009.4
ROBdi 812.45 727.95 3,241.4 2,949.437
COST $ 342,929.36
Piraeus quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 32, December 20021
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 0C
Quantity: 1099.237 mt
Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
Supplier ($) (g/ml) (cSt (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BP 177 0.990 360 0.1 5 40.08 3.33
MOTOR 177 0.991 383 0.2 5 40.03 3.40
SHELL 177 0.960 333 0.1 2 40.75 2.52
Density/Aluminium
Shell offers the fuel with the lowest density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the
380 fuels).
tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
Water Content
BP: 1,099.237mt x 0.1% = 1.0992mt
1.0992mt x $177/mt = $194.56 = $0.18/mt
MOTOR: 1,099.237mt x 0.2% = 2.1985mt
2.1985mt x $177/mt = $389.13 = $0.36/mt
SHELL: 1,099.237mt x 0.1% = 1.0992mt
1.0992mt x $177/mt = $194.56 = $0.18/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Shell offers a superior fuel. Let us see, how much one can
save in total, compared to Motor's high water content, low NSE fuel.
Energy MJ MOTOR: 1,099,237 kg x 40.03MJ/kg = 44,002,457 MJ
SHELL: 1,099,237 kg x 40.75MJ/kg = 44,793,908 MJ
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Difference
Cost / MJ
Value A MJ
(SHELL - MOTOR) A MJ = 791,451 MJ
Bunker Price: $177/mt = $177/1,000kg = $0.18/kg
$0.18/kg $0.18 =$0.00434/MJ
40.75MJ/kg 40.75MJ
791,451 MJ x $0.00434/MJ = $3437.71
Saving
SHELL
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$3,437.71
= $3.13 / mt
1,099.237mt
$177/mt
-$0.18
-$3.13
$173.69/mt
Shell is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Motor at $173.69 rather than $177, as Shell comparatively offers this price
advantage.
For the bunkering at the Dardanelles, the author assumes that fuel was purchased
from either Canakkale or Gelibolu, but since the DNV Fuel Quality Statistics book does
not have any statistics on any of the two, further calculations are not performed. In any
case, significant savings are already observed, due to not bunkering at Piraeus.
SUEZMAX VOYAGE #2
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (5/21/02 - 6/14/02).
Wilhelmshaven I Le Havre Corpus Christi
Cj 77.72 870
Qj 1,901.52 0
ROBj 1,251 1,141.28 2,072.0
ROBdj 1,219 2,942.0 1,877
$ 288,080.28
Le Havre quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 31, September 2002]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 C
Quantity: 1,498.10 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
MOBIL 151.5 0.985 333 0.1 3 40.32 2.87
SHELL 151.5 0.978 362 0.1 4 40.29 3.28
TOTAL 151.5 0.987 322 0.0 3 40.35 2.78
Density/Aluminium
Shell offers the fuel with the lowest density and low aluminium content.
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I COST
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
380 fuels).
Water Content
MOBIL: 1,498.1Omt x 0.1% = 1.4981mt
1.4981mt x $151.5/mt = $226.96 = $0.15/mt
SHELL: 1,498.1Omt x 0.1%= 1.4981mt
1.4981mt x $151.5/mt = $226.96 = $0.15/mt
TOTAL: $0.00/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Total offers a superior fuel to the other two. Let us see,
how much one can save in total, compared to Shell's fuel low-density fuel.
Energy MJ SHELL: 1,498,100 kg x 40.35MJ/kg = 60,448,335 MJ
TOTAL: 1,498,100 kg x 40.29MJ/kg = 60,358,449 MJ
Difference (SHELL - TOTAL) A MJ= 89,886 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $151.5/mt = $151.5/1,000kg = $0.15/kg
$0.15 /kg $0.15
= = $0.00375/MJ
40.35MJ/kg 40.35MJ
Value A MJ 89,886 MJ x $0.00375/MJ= $337.49
$337.49
Saving $349 = $0.23 /mt
1,498. Imt
TOTAL
Price: $151.5/mt
Water: -$0.15
Net Specific Energy: -$0.23
$151.12/mt
Global is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Global Energy at $151.12 rather than $151.5, as Global comparatively offers
this price advantage.
For the port of Corpus Christi similar calculations are performed.
Corpus Christi quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 31, September 2002]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 "C
Quantity: 403.46 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
ENJET 156 0.988 364 0.2 28 40.18 3.04
VALERO 156 0.988 322 0.1 13 40.38 2.57
Density/Aluminium
Valero's fuel has the same density as Enjet's fuel, but Enjet's high aluminium content
may compromise an engine's operation and performance.
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Viscosity
Both fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO 380
fuels).
Water Content
ENJET: 403.46mt x 0.2% = 0.80692mt
0.80692mt x $156/mt = $125.88 = $0.31/mt
VALERO: 403.46mt x 0.1% = 0.40346mt
0.40346mt x $156/mt = $62.94 = $0.16/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the two suppliers, Valero offers a superior fuel to Enjet's. Let us see, how
much one can save in total.
Energy MJ ENJET: 403,460 kg x 40.18MJ/kg = 16,211,023 MJ
VALERO: 403,460 kg x 40.38MJ/kg = 16,291,715 MJ
Difference (VALERO - ENJET) A MJ= 80,692 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $156/mt = $156/1000kg = $0.16/kg
$0.16 /kg $0.16 = $0.00386/MJ
40.38MJ/kg 40.38MJ
Value A MJ 80,692 MJ x $0.00386/MJ = $311.74
$311.74 = $0.77 /mt
403.46mt
VALERO
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$156/mt
-$0.15
-$0.77
$155.08/mt
Valero is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Enjet at $155.08 rather than $156, as Valero comparatively offers this price
advantage.
SUEZMAX VOYAGE #3
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (5/25/01 - 6/20/01).
T ' rLOOP Cayo Arcas Freeport Bilbao La Coruna
Ci 93.6 145 732.25 46.4
Qi 799 600.4
ROBi 670.4 427.2 491.7 432.7
ROBdi 764 572.2 1224 479.1 963
COST $ 175,554.73
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Saving
Freeport quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 "C
Quantity: 799 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
SuBORO ($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BORCO 125.45 0.983 357 0.4 9 40.18 2.87
At Freeport the only fuel oil supplier that delivers IFO 380 is Borco and its fuel's
quality data may be found in the above table.
Corunna quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 *C
Quantity: 600.4 mt
. Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
Suppler ($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
FORESTAL 128.5 0.974 340 0.5 4 40.46 2.30
REPSOL 128.5 0.985 359 0.0 10 40.47 2.48
Density/Aluminium
Forestal's fuel is superior to Repsol's fuel both in terms of density
content.
Viscosity
Both fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408
fuels).
and aluminium
cSt for IFO 380
Water Content
FORESTAL: 600.4mt x 0.5% = 3.002mt
3.002mt x $128.5/mt = $385.757 = $0.64/mt
REPSOL: $0.00/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the two suppliers, Repsol offers a superior fuel to Forestal's. Let us see, how
much one can
Energy MJ
Difference
Cost / MJ
Value A MJ
Saving
save in total.
FORESTAL: 600,400 kg x 40.46MJ/kg = 24,292,184 MJ
REPSOL: 600,400 kg x 40.47MJ/kg = 24,298,188 MJ
(RESPOL - FORESTAL) A MJ = 6,004 MJ
Bunker Price: $128.5/mt = $128.5/1,000kg = $0.13/kg
$0.13/kg 
_$0.13
- =$0.00318/MJ
40.47MJ/kg 40.47MJ
6,004 MJ x $0.00318/MJ = $19.06
$19.06 = $0.03 /rmt
600.4mt
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RESPOL
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$128.5/mt
-$0.64
-$0.03
$127.83/mt
Repsol is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Forestal at $127.83 rather than $128.5, as Repsol comparatively offers this
price advantage.
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Appendix 8
AFRAMAX VOYAGE #1
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (2/20/03 - 3/30/03).
Lawe-Lawe I Singapore I Suez Dardanelles Bosporus Odessa Bourgwas
Cj 208 936 104 20.8 52 58
Qj 316.05 1,888.517
ROBj 623.7 0.0 1,749.5 1,693.7 1,624.2 1,512
ROBdj 831.7 936.0 1,853.5 1,714.5 1,676.2 1,570.217 1,500
$ 400,321.96
Singapore quality comparison (180 cSt). [Ref 32, December 2002]
Product: IFO 180 cSt, 50 C
Quantity: 1,004.5 mt
.i Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
Suppler ($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BP 209 0.985 199 0.2 12 40.21 3.08
GLOBAL
ENERGY 209 0.979 184 0.2 8 40.25 3.19
SHELL 209 0.982 172 0.1 1 40.19 3.41
Density/Aluminium
Global Energy offers the fuel with the lowest density and low aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 200 cSt for IFO 180
fuels.
Water Content
BP: 1,004.5mt x 0.2% = 2.009mt
2.009mt x $209/mt = $419.88 = $0.42/mt
GLOBAL ENERGY: 1,004.5mt x 0.2% = 2.009mt
2.009mt x $209/mt = $419.88 = $0.42/mt
SHELL: 1,004.5mt x 0.1% = 1.0045mt
1.0045mt x $209/mt = $209.94 = $0.21/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Global Energy offers the fuel with the highest NSE, but
Shell may provide a 'better value for money' fuel for having low water content.
Energy MJ GLOBAL ENERGY: 1,004,500 kg x 40.25MJ/kg = 40,431,125 MJ
SHELL: 1,004,500 kg x 40.19MJ/kg = 40,370,855 MJ
Difference (GLOBAL ENERGY - SHELL) A MJ = 60,270 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $209/mt = $209/1,000kg = $0.21/kg
$0.21/kg $0.21 = $0.00519 /MJ
40.25MJ/ kg 40.25MJ
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COST
$3,12.95Saving $= $0.31/mt
1,004.5mt
GLOBAL ENERGY
Price: $209/mt
Water: +$0.21
Net Specific Energy: -$0.31
$208.9/mt
Global Energy is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to
purchase fuel from Shell at $208.9 rather than $209, as Shell comparatively offers this
price advantage.
For the Suez Canal similar calculations are performed.
Suez quality comparison (180 cSt). [Ref. 32, December 2002]
Product: IFO 180 cSt, 50 *CQuantity: 1,200.067 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
COPETROL 177 0.950 199 0.1 1 40.82 2.80
EXXONMOBIL 177 0.949 174 0.1 0 40.83 2.73
MOBIL 177 0.948 176 0.1 2 40.86 2.70
Density/Aluminium
All three fuels have similar density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 200 cSt for IFO 180
fuels.
Water Content
COPETROL: 1,200.067 x 0.1% = 1.200mt
1.200mt x $177/mt = $212.41 = $0.18/mt
EXXONMOBIL: 1,200.067 x 0.1% = 1.200mt
1.200mt x $177/mt = $212.41 = $0.18/mt
MOBIL: 1,200.067 x 0.1%= 1.200mt
1.200mt x $177/mt = $212.41 = $0.18/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Mobil offers a superior fuel, with the highest Net Specific
Energy. Let us see how this compares to Copetrol's denser fuel with the lowest NSE.
Energy MJ COPETROL: 1,200,067 kg x 40.82MJ/kg = 48,986,735 MJ
MOBIL: 1,200,067 kg x 40.86MJ/kg = 49,034,738 MJ
Difference (MOBIL - COPETROL) A MJ = 48,003 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $177/mt = $177/1,000kg = $0.18/kg
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Value A MJ K0270 MJ x $0.00519/MJ = $312.95
Value A MJ
Saving
MOBIL
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
Therefore, if fuel
negotiated to $176.83.
$0.18/kg $0.18 =$0.00433/MJ
40.86MJ/kg 40.86MJ
48,003 MJ x $0.00433/MJ = $207.94
$207.94
= $0.17 /mt
1,200.067mt
$177/mt
$0.00
-$0.17
$176.83/mt
oil were to be purchased from Mobil, the price could be
AFRAMAX VOYAGE #2
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (11/25/02 - 1/22/03).
Texas City
Southwest
Pass Convent Norco
St.
Eustatius Sing~apore
Cj 52 39 0 394.4 2,320
Qj 2,432.3752 1,107.1438
ROBj 1,722.8 1,663.8 1,614.8 1,160.2 1,233.0
ROBdj 1,774.8 1,702.8 1,614.8 1,554.6 3,553.0 2,266.4
COST $ 573,913.61
St. Eustatius quality comparison (180 cSt). [Ref. 32, December 2002]
Product: IFO 180 cSt, 50 0C
Quantity: 1,349.783 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
STATI 154.7 0.981 200 0.3 14 40.38 2.53
At St. Eustatius the only fuel oil supplier that delivers IFO 180 is Stati and its
fuel's quality data may be found in the above table.
Singapore quality comparison (180 cSt). [Ref. 32, December 2002]
Product: IFO 180 cSt, 50 0C
Quantity: 2,189.736 mt
Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE SulphurSupplier ($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BP 178.5 0.985 199 0.2 12 40.21 3.08
GLOBAL 178.5 0.979 184 0.2 8 40.25 3.19ENERGY
SHELL 178.5 0.982 172 0.1 1 40.19 3.41
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Density/Aluminium
Global Energy offers the fuel with the lowest density and low aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the
fuels.
Water Content
BP: 2,189.736mt x 0.2% = 4.3795mt
4.3795mt x $178.5/mt = $781.74 = $0.36/mt
GLOBAL ENERGY: 2,189.736mt x 0.2% = 4.3795mt
4.3795mt x $178.5/mt = $781.74 = $0.36/mt
SHELL: 2,189.736mt x 0.1%= 2.1897mt
2.1897mt x $178.5/mt = $390.87 = $0.18/mt
tolerance of 200 cSt for IFO 180
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Global Energy offers the fuel with the highest NSE, but
Shell may provide a 'better value for money' fuel for having low water content.
Energy MJ
Difference
GLOBAL ENERGY: 2,189,736 kg x 40.25MJ/kg = 88,136,874 MJ
SHELL: 2,189,736 kg x 40.19MJ/kg = 88,005,490 MJ
(GLOBAL ENERGY - SHELL) A MJ= 131,384 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $178.5/mt = $178.5/1,000kg = $0.18/kg
$0.18 /kg $0.18 $0.00443/MJ
40.25MJ/kg 40.25MJ
Value A MJ
Saving
131,384 MJ x $0.00443/MJ= $582.66
$582.66 = $0.27/mt
2,189.736mt
GLOBAL ENERGY
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$178.5/mt
+$0.18
-$0.27
$178.41/mt
Global Energy is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to
purchase fuel from Shell at $178.41 rather than $178.5, as Shell comparatively offers this
price advantage.
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AFRAMAX VOYAGE #3
Bunkering Cost
Lavera
Minimisation (2/20/03 - 3/30/03).
Skikda Algeciras New York
C_ _60.5 128.1 1,006.5
___2,709.13 0
ROBj 594.3 96.3 1,706.5
ROBdj 654.8 224.4 2,713.0 1,290
$ 455,133.84
Algeciras quality comparison (180 cSt). [Ref. 32, December 2002]
Product: IFO 180 cSt, 50 0C
Quantity: 1,500 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
CSA ($ (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
CEPSA 168 0.984 183 0.1 9 40.21 3.17
REPSOL 168 0.974 163 0.1 6 40.56 2.57
RYTTSA 168 0.972 172 0.1 5 40.62 2.47
Density/Aluminium
Ryttsa offers the fuel with the lowest density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 200 cSt for IFO 180
fuels.
Water Content
CEPSA: 1,500mt x 0.1% = 1.50mt
1.50mt x $168/mt = $252= $0.17/mt
REPSOL: 1,500mt x 0.1% = 1.50mt
1.50mt x $168/mt = $252= $0.17/mt
RYTTSA: 1,500mt x 0.1% = 1.50mt
1.50mt x $168/mt = $252= $0.17/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Ryttsa offers the fuel with the highest NSE; let us see how
much one can save compared to Cepsa's fuel oil.
Energy MJ CEPSA: 1,500,000 kg x 40.21MJ/kg = 60,315,000 MJ
RYTTSA: 1,500,000 kg x 40.62MJ/kg = 60,930,000 MJ
Difference (RYTTSA - CEPSA) A MJ = 615,000 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $168/mt = $168/1,000kg = $0.17/kg
$0.17 /kg 
_ $0.17 = $0.00414 / MJ
40.62MJ / kg 40.62MJ
Value A MJ 615,000 MJ x $0.00414/MJ = $2,543.57
COST
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$2,543.57Saving $= $1.70 /mt
1500mt
RYTTSA
Price: $168/mt
Water: $0.00
Net Specific Energy: -$1.70
$166.3/mt
Ryttsa is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Cepsa at $166.3 rather than $168, as Ryttsa comparatively offers this price
advantage.
For the port of New York similar calculations are performed.
New York quality comparison (180 cSt). [Ref 32, December 2002]
Product: IFO 180 cSt, 50 C
Quantity: 1,209.13 mt
. Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
Supper ($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BP 173.9 0.982 184 0.4 13 40.20 2.89
CHEMOIL 173.9 0.972 178 0.2 9 40.52 2.65
FAMM 173.9 0.973 173 0.2 2 40.18 3.62
Density/Aluminium
Chemoil's and Famm's fuels have low density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 200 cSt for IFO 180
fuels.
Water Content
BP: 1,209.13 x 0.4% = 4.8365mt
4.8365mt x $173.9/mt = $841.07 = $0.70/mt
CHEMOIL: 1,209.13 x 0.2% = 2.4183mt
2.4183mt x $173.9/mt $420.54 = $0.35/mt
FAMM: 1,209.13 x 0.2% = 2.4183mt
2.4183mt x $173.9/mt = $420.54 = $0.35/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Chemoil offers a superior fuel, with the highest Net
Specific Energy. Let us see how this compares to BP's denser fuel with not the lowest
NSE, but with high water content.
Energy MJ BP: 1,209,130 kg x 40.20MJ/kg = 48,607,026 MJ
CHEMOIL: 1,209,130 kg x 40.52MJ/kg = 48,993,948 MJ
Difference (CHEMOIL - BP) A MJ = 386,922 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $173.9/mt = $173.9/1,000kg = $0.17/kg
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$0.17/ kg
40.52MJ / kg
Value A MJ
Saving
$0.17 = $0.00429/MJ
40.52MJ
386,922 MJ x $0.00429/MJ = $1,660.56
$1,660.56
1,209.13mt
CHEMOIL
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$173.9/mt
-$0.20
-$1.37
$172.33/mt
Therefore, if fuel oil were to be purchased from BP, the price could be negotiated to
$172.33.
127
Appendix 9
PRODUCT VOYAGE #1
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (12/8/02 - 1/3/03).
Conakry Algeciras Suez Yanbu
C_168 148.4 39.2 42.625 190.65
Qj 970.25 287.75
ROBj 232 1,051.6 986.0 933.8 719.8
ROBdj 400 1,200.0 1,025.2 976.4 910.5 987
COST $ 168,538.75
Algeciras quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 32, December 2002]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 C
Quantity: 750 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
A $) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
CEPSA 131 0.986 344 0.0 8 40.34 2.81
REPSOL 131 0.983 373 0.0 8 40.48 2.46
RYTTSA 131 0.983 370 0.0 8 40.49 2.43
Density/Aluminium
All three fuels have similar density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance
380 fuels).
of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
Water Content
CEPSA: $0.00/mt
REPSOL: $0.00/mt
RYTTSA: $0.00/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Ryttsa offers the fuel with the highest NSE; let us see how
much one can save by negotiating to buy fuel at a lower price from Cepsa.
Energy MJ CEPSA: 750,000 kg x 40.34MJ/kg = 30,255,000 MJ
RYTTSA: 750,000 kg x 40.49MJ/kg = 30,367,500 MJ
Difference (CEPSA - RYTTSA) A MJ = 112,500 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $131/mt $131/1,000kg = $0.13/kg
$0.13/kg $0.13
= ~= $0.00324 /MJ
40.49MJ/ kg 40.49MJ
Value A MJ 112,500 MJ x $0.00324/MJ $363.98
Saving $363.98 = $0.49 /mt
750mt
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Suez Algeciras
RYTTSA
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$13 1/mt
$0.01
-$0.49
$130.5 1/mt
Ryttsa is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Cepsa at $130.51 rather than $131, as Ryttsa comparatively offers this price
advantage. Thus, when bunkering from Algeciras on 1/3/03, fuel oil can be bought at
$143.51 rather than $144.
PRODUCT VOYAGE #2
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (3/18/01 - 5/2/01).
San Fransisco Ulsan Los Ang~eles 1
_Cj 458.85 529.7
Qj 757.35 43.70
ROBj 913 451.65 670.3
ROBdj 910.5 1,200.0 694
COST $ 123,755.18
Ulsan quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 "C
Quantity: 500 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) ( (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
CALTEX 152.5 0.980 338 0.0 5 40.26 3.38
SK 152.5 0.965 362 0.0 0 40.49 3.23
TEXACO 152.5 0.984 342 0.0 9 40.50 2.45
Density/Aluminium
SK offers the fuel with the lowest density and
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits,,
380 fuels).
aluminium content.
i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
Water Content
CALTEX: $0.00/mt
SK: $0.00/mt
TEXACO: $0.00/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Texaco offers the fuel with the highest NSE; let us see how
much one can save by negotiating to buy fuel at a lower price from Caltex.
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'
Energy MJ
Difference
Cost / MJ
Value A MJ
Saving
CALTEX: 500,000 kg x 40.26MJ/kg = 20,130,000 MJ
TEXACO: 500,000 kg x 40.50MJ/kg = 20,250,000 MJ
(TEXACO - CALTEX) A MJ = 120,000 MJ
Bunker Price: $152.5/mt = $152.5/1,000kg = $0.15/kg
$0.15 /kg $0.15 $0.00375/MJ
40.50MJ/kg 40.50MJ
120,000 MJ x $0.00375/MJ = $450.37
$450.37 = $0.90 /mt
500mt
TEXACO
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$152.5/mt
$0.00
-$0.90
$151.6/mt
Texaco is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Caltex at $151.6 rather than $152.5, as Texaco comparatively offers this price
advantage.
Los Angeles quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 0C
Quantity: 301 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
CHEM OIL 189 0.987 349 0.5 7 40.29 2.31
FAMM 189 0.986 339 0.2 5 40.55 1.96
TESORO 189 0.988 308 0.6 9 40.22 2.26
Density/Aluminium
Famm offers the fuel with the lowest density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
380 fuels).
Water Content
CHEM OIL: 301mt x 0.5% = 1.505mt
1.505mt x $189/mt = $284.45 = $0.94/mt
FAMM: 301mt x 0.2% = 0.602mt
0.602mt x $189/mt = $113.78 = $0.38/mt
TESORO: 301mt x 0.6%= 1.806mt
1.806mt x $189/mt = $341.33 = $1.13/mt
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Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, Famm offers the fuel with the highest NSE; let us see how
much one can save by negotiating to buy fuel at a lower price from Tesoro.
Energy MJ FAMM: 301,000 kg x 40.55MJ/kg = 12,205,550 MJ
TESORO: 301,000 kg x 40.22MJ/kg = 12,106,220 MJ
Difference (FAMM - TESORO) A MJ = 99,330 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $189/mt = $189/1,000kg = $0.19/kg
$0.19/kg $0.19
= = $0.00466 /MJ
40.55MJ/kg 40.55MJ
Value A MJ 99,330 MJ x $0.00466/MJ= $462.97
Saving
FAMM
Price:
Water:
Net Specific Energy:
$462.97 = $1.54 / mt
301mt
$189/mt
-$0.75
-$1.54
$186.71 /mt
Famm is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase
fuel from Tesoro at $186.71 rather than $189, as Famm comparatively offers this price
advantage.
PRODUCT VOYAGE #3
Bunkering Cost Minimisation (12/22/00 - 2/7/01).
San Juan Bonny Houston
C _ 326.2 546
Qj 213.7 1,185
ROBJ 707 583.5 0.0
ROBdj 909.7 546.0 1,163
COST $ 184,123.80
San Juan quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 20011
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 *C
Quantity: 399 mt
Supplier Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur($) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
HARBOR 174 0.982 338 0.4 9 40.45 2.07FUEL
Density/Aluminium
At San Juan the only fuel oil supplier that delivers IFO 380 is Harbor Fuel and its
fuel's quality data may be found in the above table.
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Houston quality comparison (380 cSt). [Ref. 30, June 2001]
Product: IFO 380 cSt, 50 "C
Quantity: 1,000 mt
. Price Density Viscosity Water Al NSE Sulphur
Supper $) (g/ml) (cSt) (%v/v) (mg/kg) (MJ/kg) (%m/m)
BP 124 0.987 337 0.1 6 40.14 3.29
FAMM 124 0.990 326 0.1 9 40.05 3.42
HMS 124 0.982 346 0.1 1 40.25 3.16
Density/Aluminium
HMS offers the fuel with the lowest density and aluminium content.
Viscosity
All three fuels are within the tolerable limits, i.e. the tolerance of 7.4% (408 cSt for IFO
380 fuels).
Water Content
BP: 1,000mt x 0.1% = 1.Mimt
1.00mt x $124/mt $124 = $0.124/mt
FAMM: 1,000mt x 0.1% = 1.00mt
1.00mt x $124/mt = $124 = $0.124/mt
HMS: 1,000mt x 0.1% = 1.00mt
1.00nt x $124/mt = $124 = $0.124/mt
Net Specific Energy
Of the three suppliers, HMS offers the fuel with the highest NSE; let us see how
much one can save by negotiating to buy fuel at a lower price from Famm.
Energy MJ FAMM: 1,000,000 kg x 40.05MJ/kg = 40,050,000 MJ
HMS: 1,000,000 kg x 40.25MJ/kg = 40,250,000 MJ
Difference (HMS - FAMM) A MJ = 200,000 MJ
Cost / MJ Bunker Price: $124/mt = $124/1000kg = $0.12/kg
$0.12/kg 
_ $0.12 =$0.00308/MJ
40.25MJ / kg 40.25MJ
Value A MJ 200,000 MJ x $0.00308/MJ = $616.15
Saving $616.15 = $0.62/ mt
1,000mt
HMS
Price: $124/mt
Water: $0.00
Net Specific Energy: -$0.62
$123.38/mt
HMS is therefore selected and the shipping company may negotiate to purchase fuel from
Famm at $123.38 rather than $124, as HMS comparatively offers this price advantage.
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